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INTRODUCTION 
It is often said that U.S. legal culture discourages apologies.1 
Defendants, defense counsel, and insurers worry that statements of 
apology will be admissible at trial and will be interpreted by jurors and 
judges as admissions of responsibility.2 In recent years, however, 
several legal commentators have suggested that disputants in civil 
lawsuits should be encouraged to apologize to opposing parties.3 They 
claim that apologies will avert lawsuits and promote settlement.4 
1. See, e.g. , Hiroshi Wagatsuma & Arthur Rosett, The Implications of Apology: Law and 
Culture in Japan and the United States, 20 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 461 (1986). 
2. See infra Part I.A. 
3. See, e.g. , Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1009 
(1999) [hereinafter Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize]; Steven Keeva, Does Law Mean 
Never Having to Say You're Sorry? A.B.A. J., Dec. 1999, at 64; Aviva Orenstein, Apology 
Excepted: Incorporating a Feminist Analysis into Evidence Policy Where You Would Least 
Expect It, 28 Sw. U. L. REV. 221 (1999); Daniel Shuman, The Role of Apology in Tort Law, 
83 JUDICATURE 180 (2000) [hereinafter Shuman, The Role of Apology in Tort Law]; 
Deborah L. Levi, Note, The Role of Apology in Mediation, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 165 (1997). 
4. Approximately fifteen million civil cases and hundreds of thousands of tort claims are 
filed in state courts each year. See COURT STATISTICS PROJECT STAFF, NAT'L CTR. FOR 
STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 2001 (2001), available at 
http://www.ncsconline.org/D _Research/csp/CSP _Main_Page.html; COURT ST A TISTICS 
PROJECT STAFF, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS, 
2001 194 tbl.16 (2001), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/csp/2001_Files/ 
2001_Tables_l0-16.pdf. An untold number of additional disputes occur, but are resolved in 
some way prior to a formal legal filing. See William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and 
Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, and Claiming, 15 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 631 
(1980-81). The majority of these cases are ultimately resolved through settlement in some 
way. See id. ; Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle": Judicial Promotion and 
Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339 (1994); Chris Guthrie, Procedural Justice 
Research and the Paucity of Trials, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 127; Michael J. Saks, Do We Really 
Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System - and Why Not? 140 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1 147 (1992). In fact, the percentage of cases that are resolved by trial is 
declining. See Hope Viner Samborn, The Vanishing Trial, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2002, at 24. These 
settlements, however, are often not reached before the parties have been subjected to 
considerable expense - in terms of time, finances, and emotion. As Judge Learned Hand 
has said, "I must say that as a litigant I should dread a lawsuit beyond almost anything else 
short of sickness and death." Learned Hand, The Deficiencies of Trials to Reach the Heart of 
the Matter, 3 LECTURES ON LEGAL TOPICS 89, 105 (1921); see also Thomas 8. Metzloff, 
Resolving Malpractice Disputes: Imaging the Jury's Shadow, 54 LA w & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
43, 59 & n.54 (1991) (finding that many cases settle right before trial). At the same time 
there is continuing debate about the merits of settling civil cases. See, e.g. , Owen Fiss, 
Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984); Galanter & Cahill, supra; Andrew McThenia 
& Thomas L. Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 YALE L.J. 1660 (1985); Carrie Menkel­
Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory Settlement 
Conference, 33 UCLA L. REV. 485 (1985) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, For and Against 
Settlement]; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute is it Anyway? A Philosophical and 
Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663 (1995) [hereinafter, 
Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute]. 
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Consistent with this view, legislatures in several states have 
enacted statutes that are intended to encourage and protect apologies 
by making them inadmissible.5 In addition, some commentators argue 
that defendants might offer expressions of sympathy, rather than 
apologies that explicitly accept responsibility for having caused injury, 
in order to reap the benefits of apologizing while minimizing the risks.6 
Critics of these so-called "safe" apologies argue, however, that 
apologies that avoid the legal consequences of apologizing - whether 
because the apology is merely an expression of sympathy or because it 
is protected by statute and is inadmissible - are devoid of moral 
content and likely ineffectual.7 
Despite the recent surge of interest in, and debate over, the 
potential benefits of apologizing in legal cases, there has been very 
little empirical exploration8 of the ways in which apologies actually 
affect settlement decisionmaking.9 This Article seeks to fill the gap by 
providing much-needed data. The studies described here explore the 
proposition that apologies facilitate the settlement of civil disputes 
either by increasing potential plaintiffs' inclination to accept a 
particular settlement offer or by altering parties' perceptions and 
attributions in ways that might smooth the progress toward reaching a 
mutually satisfactory settlement agreement. More specifically, these 
studies explore the differing ways in which apologies are perceived 
and responded to when crafted to better insulate the offeror from 
legal liability (e.g., expressions of sympathy and statutorily protected 
apologies). This research suggests that an apology may favorably 
impact the prospects for settlement but that attention must be paid to 
both the nature of the apologetic expression and the circumstances of 
the individual case. 
Part I describes the legal debate over the role of apologies in 
settlement decisionmaking. In particular, this Part describes the legal 
admissibility of apologies and the debate surrounding the offering of 
legally safe apologies. Part II details the previous empirical research 
that has examined the effects of apologies on perception and 
decisionmaking. Part III describes the empirical studies and presents 
5. See infra Part J.C. 
6. See infra Part LB. 
7. See, e.g. , Lee Taft, Apology Subverted: The Commodification of Apology, 109 YALE 
L.J. 1135 (2000). For further discussion, see infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text. 
8. For discussion of the role of empiricism in legal scholarship, see Lee Epstein & Gary 
King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2002) ;  Michael Heise, The Importance of 
Being Empirical, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 807 (1999). 
9. Apologizing may influence a variety of legal decisions in civil cases, including effects 
on settlement decisions, decisions about liability, and decisions about compensatory or 
punitive damages. All of these decision points are in need of empirical examination. The 
focus here is limited to one of these decision points - decisions about settlement. 
December 2003] Apologies and Legal Settlement 463 
the results. Part IV examines the implications of these results for the 
debate over evidentiary protection for apologies, for parties to 
litigation, and for attorneys representing clients in such litigation. 
I. LEGAL DEBATE OVER APOLOGIES 
Recently, legal scholars have argued that apologizing has 
important benefits for both parties to a lawsuit, including increasing 
the possibilities for reaching settlements.10 Accordingly, these scholars 
have suggested that lawyers should discuss apologies with their clients 
more often than they now do. They suggest that apologizing may 
avoid litigation altogether, and even where it does not it may reduce 
tension, antagonism, and anger so as to allow less protracted, more 
productive, more creative, and more satisfying negotiation.1 1  Survey 
research suggests that claimants desire apologies and that some would 
not have filed suit had an apology been offered.12 In addition, there is 
10. See Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, supra note 3; Keeva, supra note 3; Levi, 
supra note 3; Orenstein, supra note 3; Peter H. Rehm & Denise R. Beatty, Legal 
Consequences of Apologizing, 1996 J. DISP. RESOL. 1 15; Carl D. Schneider, What It Means 
To Be Sorry: The Power of Apology in Mediation, 17 MEDIATION Q. 265 (2000); Shuman, 
The Role of Apology in Tort Law, supra note 3; see also Erin Ann O'Hara & Douglas Yarn, 
On Apology and Consilience, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1 121 (2002). 
11. STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION 138 (2d ed., 1992); Cohen, 
Advising Clients to Apologize, supra note 3; Levi, supra note 3; Orenstein, supra note 3; 
Shuman, The Role of Apology in Tort Law, supra note 3. In addition to the strategic benefits 
of apologies for settlement, which are the focus here, a number of nonstrategic benefits of 
apologies in civil cases are also posited. Apologies may reduce negative emotions, repair 
relationships, fulfill a need to make reparations and to restore equity, make forgiveness 
possible, and facilitate psychological growth. GOLDBERG ET AL., supra, at 138; see also 
Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, supra note 3; Michael E. McCullogh et al., 
Interpersonal Forgiving in Close Relationships, 73 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 321 
(1997); Orenstein, supra note 3, at 243-44; Elaine Waister et al., New Directions in Equity 
Research, 25 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1 (1973); Gerald R. Williams, Negotiation as 
a Healing Process, 1996 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 53; Charlotte vanOyen Witvliet et al., Please 
Forgive Me: Transgressors' Emotions and Physiology During Imagery of Seeking Forgiveness 
and Victim Responses, 21 J. PSYCHOL. & CHRISTIANITY 219 (2002); Charlotte Witvliet et al., 
Victims' Heart Rate and Facial EMG Responses to Receiving an Apology and Restitution, 
PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 588 (2002). 
12. See Thomas H. Gallagher et al., Patients' and Physicians' Attitudes Regarding the 
Disclosure of Medical Errors, 289 JAMA 1001 (2003) (finding that patients emphasized a 
desire to receive an apology following a medical error); Gerald B. Hickson et al., Factors 
That Prompted Families to File Medical Malpractice Claims Following Prenatal Injuries, 267 
JAMA 1359, 1361 (1992) (noting that 24% filed claims "when they realized that physicians 
had failed to be completely honest with them about what happened, allowed them to believe 
things that were not true, or intentionally misled them"); Charles Vincent et al., Why Do 
People Sue Doctors? A Study of Patients and Relatives Taking Legal Action, 343 LANCET 
1609, 1612 (1994) (finding that 37% of respondents said that they would not have sued had 
there been a full explanation and an apology and 14% indicated that they would not have 
sued had there been an admission of negligence); Amy B. Witman et al., How Do Patients 
Want Physicians to Handle Mistakes? A Survey of Internal Medicine Patients in an Academic 
Setting, 156 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 2565, 2566 (1996) (finding that 98% of 
respondents "desired or expected the physician's active acknowledgement of an error. This 
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anecdotal evidence of injured parties who would not have filed 
lawsuits had apologies been proffered, 13 of settlement negotiations 
coming to a standstill over the issue of apology even after agreement 
on an appropriate damage amount has been reached,14 of plaintiffs 
who would have preferred an apology as part of a settlement,15 and of 
occasions on which a failure to apologize promoted litigation by 
adding insult to injury.16 In those few cases that go to trial, it is 
suggested that a defendant who has apologized will look better in 
front of a jury who is asked to award damages, particularly punitive 
damages.17 Decisions by corporations such as Wal-Mart and Ford to 
ranged form a simple acknowledgement of the error to various forms of apology" and that 
"[p]atients were significantly more likely to either report or sue the physician when he or she 
failed to acknowledge the mistake."). 
13. Bruce W. Neckers gives an example: 
In a case in which I represented the plaintiff, the wrongdoer himself tearfully acknowledged 
his role in the tragic accidental death of my client's son. It had a huge impact on the 
settlement of the case. There never would have been a lawsuit if the same person had made 
the same comments to the mother during the 30-day period in which her son lay dying in the 
hospital, or during the three days his young body was at the funeral home. The sad part in 
that case is that the defendant and his company wanted to express the same thought near the 
time of the accident, but claimed to have been prohibited from doing so by their insurance 
carrier. 
The Art of the Apology, MICH. B.J., June 2002, at 10, 11. 
14. See Schneider, supra note 10, at 274 (describing negotiations stalling "over the 
plaintiff's demand for an apology, even after the sides had agreed on the damages to be 
paid") (emphasis omitted). 
15. See, e.g. , Piper Fogg, Minnesota System Agrees to Pay $500,000 to Settle Pay-Bias 
Dispute, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 14, 2003, at A12 (describing class-action plaintiff's 
disappointed reaction to the settlement: "I want an apology," she said, "and I am never 
going to get it") (internal quotes omitted); Editorial, The Paula Jones Settlement, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 15, 1998, at C6; Nathalie Des Rosiers et al., Legal Compensation for Sexual 
Violence: Therapeutic Consequences and Consequences for the Judicial System, 4 PSYCHOL. 
PUB. POL'Y & L. 433, 442 (1998). 
16. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, supra note 3; Orenstein, supra note 3, at 243. 
17. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, supra note 3; Williams, supra note 11 ,  at 52-53 
n.147. A number of states specifically provide that an apology can be considered in 
mitigation of damages in defamation cases. See, e.g. , FLA. STAT.§ 770.02 (2003); MISS CODE 
ANN.§ 95-1-5 (1999); TENN. CODE ANN.§ 29-24-103 (2000); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE 
ANN. § 73.003 (1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-48, 8.01-46 (2000); W. VA. CODE § 57-2-4 
(1997). Some, however, worry that apologizing, "which implies knowledge of wrongdoing, 
will exacerbate damage awards by showing a level of intent beyond mere negligence." Levi, 
supra note 3, at 1187. It is likely that the effects of apologizing on damage-award 
decisionmaking will be complex. Bornstein conducted a set of empirical studies to examine 
the effects of remorse on damage-award decisionmaking. Brian H. Bornstein et al., The 
Effects of Defendant Remorse on Mock Juror Decisions in a Malpractice Case, 20 BEHA v. 
SCI. & L. 393 (2002). In the first study, male participants awarded marginally less in damages 
against the physician who expressed remorse at the time of trial or who did nothing to 
indicate remorse or a lack thereof than they did against physicians who were remorseless or 
who expressed remorse early (at the time of the incident). Id. at 399-400. For female 
participants there was no effect of remorse. Id. In a second study, participants awarded more 
in compensatory damages against the physician who displayed remorse at the time of the 
event and then again at the time of trial than they did in the other three conditions. Id. at 
403. Given potential spillover between liability and damages decisions, it is unclear how 
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issue apologies in recent cases presumably reflect this intuition about 
apologies.18 
A. Apologies and Admissibility 
Many are concerned, however, that fears of apologies being used 
to establish legal liability chill the offering of apologies. In the context 
of civil disputes, the conventional wisdom among legal actors has been 
that an apology will be viewed as an admission of responsibility and 
will lead to increased legal liability - and accordingly, that apologies 
ought to be avoided.19 Consistent with this view, Hiroshi Wagatsuma 
these results might have been affected by telling. jurors to assume that the defendant was 
liable. It is possible that jurors used the available decision to achieve goals that might 
otherwise have been achieved through the rendering of a liability verdict. See generally 
Jennifer K. Robbennolt et al., Symbolism and lncommensurability in Civil Sanctioning: 
Decision-Makers as Goal Managers, BROOK. L. REV. (forthcoming). 
18. Patti Waldmeir, Ford Goes Into the Business of Saying Sorry, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 31 ,  
2001, at  8 ;  Wendy Zellner, Wal-Mart: Why an  Apology Made Sense, Bus. WK., July 3,  2000, 
at 65. There are numerous recent examples of apologies in cases with possible legal 
implications. See, e.g. , WILLIAM J. CLINTON, Remarks Prior to the House Judiciary 
Committee Vote on the First Article of Impeachment, in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 
OF THE UNITED STATES 2158 (1999); Pam Belluck with Frank Bruni, Law, Citing Abuse 
Scandal, Quits as Boston Archbishop and Asks for Forgiveness, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2002 at 
Al;  Cathy Burke, N.J. 's Top Cop Apologizes for Race Profiling, N.Y. POST, Jan. 1 ,  2001, at 
24; Richard Huff, ABC Apology Snuffs Out Tobacco Firms' Lawsuits, DAILY NEWS, Aug. 
22, 1995, at 4; John McCormick, At MIT, the Party's Over: A Tragic Alcohol Case Concludes 
With a Costly Apology, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 25, 2000, at 45 (describing MIT's apology to the 
family of a student who was killed in a fraternity drinking incident); John Schmeltzer, We're 
Sorry, United's CEO Says in TV Ad, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 25, 2000, at l; Man Pleads Guilty to 
Diluting Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2002, at A16 (describing apology by pharmacist 
accused of diluting chemotherapy drugs). See generally Jonathan R. Cohen, Apology and 
Organizations: Exploring an Example from Medical Practice, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1447 
(2000) [hereinafter Cohen, Apology and Organizations]; Laurent Belsie, The Rise of the 
Corporate Apology, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 13, 2000, at l; Mike France, The Mea 
Culpa Defense, Bus. WK., Aug. 26, 2002, at 76. Recently, even a group of jurors offered an 
apology to the defendant they convicted. Dean E. Murphy, Jurors Who Convicted Marijuana 
Grower Seek New Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2003, at A14 (describing public apologies by the 
jurors). 
19. See generally Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, supra note 3; Levi, supra note 3. 
Empirically, it is not clear whether, under what circumstances, or to what degree an apology 
might alter the risk of an adverse liability determination. I am aware of no empirical studies 
that address whether apologies influence liability decisionmaking in civil cases. The single 
published study of the effects of apologies on juror decisionmaking in civil cases examined 
only the effect of apologizing on damage awards. Bornstein et al., supra note 17. Studies 
examining attributions of responsibility in nonlegal contexts have found that offenders who 
apologize are seen as having acted less intentionally and are blamed less. See Bruce W. 
Darby & Barry R. Schlenker, Children's Reactions to Apologies, 43 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. 
PSYCHOL. 742, 746, 749 (1982) [hereinafter Darby & Schlenker, Children's Reactions to 
Apologies]; Bruce W. Darby & Barry R. Schlenker, Childrens' Reactions to Transgressions: 
Effects of the Actor's Apology, Reputation, and Remorse, 28 BRIT. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 353, 
358-59 (1989) [hereinafter Darby & Schlenker, Children's Reactions to Transgressions]; Ken­
ichi Ohbuchi & Kobun Sato, Children's Reactions to Mitigating Accounts: Apologies, 
Excuses, and Intentionality of Harm, 134 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 5, 11 (1994); Steven J. Scher & 
John M. Darley, How Effective Are the Things People Say to Apologize? Effects of the 
Realization of the Apology Speech Act, 26 J. PSYCHOLINGUISTIC RES. 127, 134-36 (1997). 
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and Arthur Rosett note that " [a] crucial inhibition to a person making 
an apology in an American legal proceeding is the possibility that a 
sincere apology will be taken as an admission: evidence of the 
occurrence of the event and of the defendant's liability for it."20 
An apology offered by an alleged offender to an injured party is 
admissible as a party's own statement, an exception to the hearsay 
rule.21 Thus, in most jurisdictions, apologies may be admitted to prove 
liability, unless Rule 408 - protecting statements made in settlement 
discussions22 - or a mediation statute - protecting statements made 
in mediation - reaches the apology.23 Accordingly, apologies made 
Weiner and his colleagues found that offering a "confession" (that included an apology and 
acceptance of responsibility) reduced attributions of responsibility to internal causes and 
increased attributions to external causes. Bernard Weiner et al., Public Confession and 
Forgiveness, 59 J. PERSONALITY 281, 291 (1991) ("This is in accord with a conceptualization 
linking confession to perceived lack of responsibility (in spite of an admission of 
responsibility!)."). This was true in particular when the cause or causes of the incident were 
less clear. Id. at 295. Some studies, however, have found that an apology increases 
attributions of responsibility to the offender. See, e.g. , Ken-ichi Ohbuchi et al., Apology as 
Aggression Control: Its Role in Mediating Appraisal of and Response to Harm, 56 J. 
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 219, 221 (1989). 
20. Wagatsuma & Rosell, supra note 1, at 483. For comparative work on the role of 
apologies in different cultures, see, for example, Dean C. Bamlund & Miho Yoshioka, 
Apologies: Japanese and American Style, 14 INT'L J. INTERCULTURAL REL. 193 (1990); John 
0. Haley, Apology and Pardon: Learning From Japan, 41 AM. BEHA V. SCIENTIST 842 
(1998); V. Lee Hamilton & Shigeru Hagiwara, Roles, Responsibility, and Accounts Across 
Cultures, 27 INT'L J. PSYCHOL. 157 (1992); Letitia Hickson, The Social Contexts of Apology 
in Dispute Settlement: A Cross-Cultural Study, 25 ETHNOLOGY 229 (1986); Janet Holmes, 
Apologies in New Zealand English, 19 LANGUAGE Soc'Y 155 (1990); Ritsu ltoi et al., A 
Cross-Cultural Study of Preference of Accounts: Relationship Closeness, Harm Severity, and 
Motives of Account Making, 26 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 913 (1996); Naomi Sugimoto, A 
Japan-U.S. Comparison of Apology Styles, 24 COMM. RES. 349 (1997); Wagatsuma & Rosett, 
supra note 1 .  
21.  As a general matter, under the Federal Rules of Evidence or the corresponding state 
evidentiary rules, statements made out of court that are "offered in evidence to prove the 
truth of the matter asserted" are inadmissible as hearsay. FED. R. Evm. 801(c), 802. There is 
an exception, however, for statements made by a party to the litigation. Id. at 80l(d)(2). 
22. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 408 statements that are made during such 
settlement negotiations are inadmissible: 
Rule 408. Compromise and Offers to Compromise. Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or 
promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable 
consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as 
to either validity or amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim 
or its amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations is 
likewise not admissible. This rule does not require the exclusion of any evidence otherwise 
discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of compromise negotiations. This 
rule also does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such 
as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving 
an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution. 
FED. R. EVID. 408; see also FED. R. EVJD. 409 ("Rule 409. Payment of Medical and Similar 
Expenses. Evidence of furnishing or offering or promising to pay medical, hospital, or 
similar expenses occasioned by an injury is not admissible to prove liability for the injury."). 
23. A number of states provide for the protection of statements made in mediation. See 
UNIF. MEDIATION ACT§ 4, 7A U.L.A. 85 (2001) (listing state statues). See generally, Ellen 
E. Deason, The Quest for Uniformity in Mediation Confidentiality: Foolish Consistency or 
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outside of settlement negotiations24 or mediation, including those 
made before the dispute has been transformed into a more formal 
legal negotiation (e.g., apologies offered at the scene of the accident), 
may not be protected and will likely be admissible. This may be 
particularly problematic to the extent that earlier settlement of 
disputes is thought to be beneficial and to the extent that the timing of 
the apology is a factor in its effectiveness.25 In addition, Rule 408 does 
not preclude admission of the apology for a purpose other than to 
prove liability, such as for purposes of impeachment.26 
Thus, attorneys and others fear that any apology will be admitted 
into evidence as an admission of fault.27 Consequently, some clients 
are hesitant to apologize. Likewise, lawyers and insurance companies 
may be unlikely to advise their clients to apologize or to make any 
statement that could be construed as an apology. In fact, they may 
actively discourage such statements.28 
Crucial Predictability?, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 79 (2001); Alan Kirtley, The Mediation Privilege's 
Transformation from Theory to Implementation: Designing a Mediation Privilege Standard to 
Protect Mediation Participants, the Process and the Public Interest, 1995 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 
17-19. But cf Eric D. Green, A Heretical View of the Mediation Privilege, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON 
DISP. RESOL. 1 (1986); Scott H. Hughes, The Uniform Mediation Act: To the Spoiled Go the 
Privileges, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 9 (2001). 
24. See FED. R. EVID. 408; see also Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, supra note 3. 
25. Many believe that apologies are more effective if offered earlier, rather than later. 
See, e.g. , Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, supra note 3; Neckers, supra note 13, at 1 1  
("Expressing it promptly, not months or years after the fact, seems to offer the greatest hope 
for healing for the victims, but even a belated apology must be better than no apology at 
all."). This is an empirical question that is in need of additional research. See generally Sim 
B. Sitkin & Robert J. Bies, Social Accounts in Conflict Situations: Using Explanations to 
Manage Conflict, 46 HUM. REL. 349, 362 (1993) ("Research on the timing of account 
delivery in psychology has identified a simple main effect: the later the delivery of an 
explanation, the less effective it will be in ameliorating negative responses."). But cf 
Bornstein et al., supra note 17. 
26. FED. R. Evm. 408. This exposes an offender who denies responsibility at trial to the 
possibility that an apology offered in the context of settlement negotiation could be offered 
at trial, not to prove liability, but to impeach the offender. While impeachment may be 
damaging in itself, jurors may also have difficulty using such limited-use evidence only for 
the prescribed purposes (e.g., impeachment) but not for other purposes (e.g., determining 
fault). See Michele Cox & Sarah Tanford, Effects of Evidence and Instructions in Civil Trials: 
An Experimental Investigation of Rules of Admissibility, 4 Soc. BEHAV. 31  (1989); Sarah 
Tanford & Michele Cox, The Effects of Impeachment Evidence and Limiting Instructions on 
Individual and Group Decision Making, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 477 ( 1988); Roselle L. 
Wissler & Michael J. Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions: When Jurors Use Prior 
Conviction Evidence to Decide on Guilt, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 37 (1985). See Cohen, 
Advising Clients to Apologize, supra note 3 at 1035, for a general discussion of the limits of 
Rule 408 ("F.R.E. 408 does not preclude such evidence from pre-trial discovery, nor does it 
prevent such evidence from being revealed to third parties."). 
27. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, supra note 3,  at 1010 ("If a lawyer 
contemplates an apology, it may well be with a skeptical eye: Don't risk apology, it will just 
create liability."); Gallagher et al., supra note 12 (describing physicians' concern that 
offering an apology will lead to legal liability). 
28. See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 11 ,  at 138; Gallagher et al., supra note 12; Levi, 
supra note 3, at 1 186. 
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B. Expressions of Sympathy 
In response to these concerns, several commentators have 
suggested that attorneys and clients consider crafting safe apologies 
that minimize the risk that they will be used as evidence of liability.29 
Specifically, defendants might offer partial apologies that merely 
express sympathy, but do not admit responsibility. 
As a general matter, in accounting for wrongful behavior, an 
offender can assert his or her innocence (e.g., by declaring he or she 
was not involved), offer an excuse that minimizes responsibility, or 
offer a justification for the act that legitimizes it. Alternatively, the 
offender can offer an apology that admits blame and expresses 
regret.30 In defining apologies as remedial work, Erving Goffman 
writes: 
In its fullest form, the apology has several elements: expression of 
embarrassment and chagrin; clarification that one knows what conduct 
had been expected and sympathizes with the application of negative 
sanction; verbal rejection, repudiation, and disavowal of the wrong way 
of behaving along with vilification of the self that so behaved; espousal of 
the right way and an avowal henceforth to pursue that course; 
performance of penance and the volunteering of restitution.31 
Similarly, Nicholas Tavruchis suggests that, at a minimum, an apology 
must incorporate "acknowledgment of the legitimacy of the violated 
rule, admission of fault and responsibility for its violation, and the 
29. See, e.g. , Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, supra note 3. 
30. Sociologists and psychologists distinguish apologies from other types of accounts or 
remedial exchanges, such as denial, excuse, or justification. See ERVING GOFFMAN, 
RELATIONS IN PUBLIC: MICROSTUDIES OF THE PUBLIC ORDER (1971); NICHOLAS 
TAVUCHIS, MEA CULPA: A SOCIOLOGY OF APOLOGY AND RECONCILIATION (1991); Barry 
R. Schlenker & Michael F. Weigold, Interpersonal Processes Involving Impression 
Regulation and Management, 43 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 133 (1992); Marvin B. Scott & 
Stanford M. Lyman, Accounts, 33 AM. SOC. REV. 46 (1968); see also MARTHA MINOW, 
BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS 115 (1998) ("Full acceptance of responsibility 
by the wrongdoer is the hallmark of an apology."). 
31. GOFFMAN, supra note 30, at 113. Other authors have defined the elements of a full 
apology in various ways. For example, Orenstein argues that: 
At their fullest, apologies should: (1) acknowledge the legitimacy of the grievance and 
express respect for the violated rule or moral norm; (2) indicate with specificity the nature of 
the violation; (3) demonstrate understanding of the harm done; (4) admit fault and 
responsibility for the violation; (5) express genuine regret and remorse for the injury; (6) 
express concern for future good relations; (7) give appropriate assurance that the act will not 
happen again; and, if possible, (8) compensate the injured party. 
Orenstein, supra note 3, at 239. Wagatsuma and Rosett distinguish five components of a 
"meaningful" apology: the offender must acknowledge that "l. the hurtful act happened, 
caused injury, and was wrongful; 2. the apologizer was at fault and regrets participating in 
the act; 3. the apologizer will compensate the injured party; 4. the act will not happen again; 
and 5. the apologizer intends to work for good relations in the future." Wagatsuma & 
Rosett, supra note 1, at 469-70. Cohen identifies three elements: "(i) admitting one's fault, 
(ii) expressing regret for the injurious action, and (iii) expressing sympathy for the other's 
injury." Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, supra note 3, at 1014-15. 
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expression of genuine regret and remorse for the harm done. "32 In 
some sense, then, it is the admission of responsibility that distinguishes 
an apology from other forms of accounting for one's behavior. 
Nonetheless, some legal commentators suggest that defendants 
might "safely" offer apologies that are incomplete according to the 
above definitions - specifically, apologies that express sympathy, but 
do not admit fault or responsibility for the incident. For example, 
Deborah Levi suggests that "lawyers protective of their clients' 
interests might serve those interests by encouraging clients to 
apologize short of admitting liability."33 Similarly, Jonathan Cohen 
suggests that " [w]hile a full apology will usually be most powerful, 
'merely' expressing sympathy can often be a large step. "34 Defendants, 
therefore, might offer an apology that conveys sympathy - "I am 
sorry that you have been injured" - but does not acknowledge 
responsibility for the injuries inflicted.35 
Relying primarily on anecdotes, commentators assert that even 
these partial apologies36 can avoid lawsuits and facilitate settlement.37 
While the intuition is that such apologies will not be as effective as 
more complete apologies that acknowledge responsibility, partial 
apologies are thought by some to be better than failing to apologize at 
all.38 Some attorneys offer such expressions of sympathy, without 
admitting fault, in the belief that it is the right thing to do and that it 
helps to settle cases more quickly and favorably.39 
32. TA VU CHIS, supra note 30, at 3. Tavuchis argues that other features of an apology are 
implicit in "two fundamental requirements: the offender has to be sorry and has to say so." 
Id. at 36. 
33. Levi, supra note 3, at 1188. See also Gallagher et al., supra note 12, at 1004 
(describing physicians' tendencies to " 'choos(e] their words carefully' when talking with 
patients about errors."). 
34. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, supra note 3, at 1048. 
35. This distinction was central to the disagreement over the U.S.-China surveillance 
plane incident as the United States offered only an expression of sympathy for the death of a 
Chinese pilot, while China demanded a full apology that took responsibility for the incident. 
Careful Language Breaks Washington-Beijing Impasse, at http://www.cnn.com/2001/ 
WORLD/asiapcf/east/04/11/collision.letter.analysis.02/ (April 1 1 ,  2001). While this incident 
differs from civil litigation because it involved an apology in a public, political context, it 
illustrates the general tension at issue. 
36. In the present Article, "partial apology" will be used to refer to a statement that 
expresses sympathy, but does not admit responsibility. These will be contrasted with "full 
apologies," in which the offender both expresses sympathy and accepts responsibility. These 
have been variously referred to as "effective" apologies, "authentic" apologies, "genuine" 
apologies, and "happy-ending" apologies. 
37. See Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, supra note 3; Orenstein, supra note 3; 
Elizabeth Latif, Note, Apologetic Justice: Evaluating Apologies Tailored Toward Legal 
Solutions, 81 B.U. L. REV. 289 (2001). 
38. See Orenstein, supra note 3. 
39. See Cohen, Apology and Organizations, supra note 18. 
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Moreover, many supporters of partial apologies believe that judges 
and jurors will be able to distinguish between expressions of sympathy 
for a plaintiff's injuries and apologies that accept responsibility for 
having caused those injuries. Accordingly, they argue that the risk that 
a partial apology will be misinterpreted as evidence of liability is 
minimal. Peter Rehm and Denise Beatty review the few published 
appellate opinions involving apologies and conclude that "Ll]udges and 
juries understand that expression of sympathy, regret, remorse and 
apology are not necessarily admissions of responsibility or liability."40 
Similarly, Cohen argues that "most judges and juries are good at 
distinguishing between expressions of sympathy and expressions of 
fault or regret, and may even be favorably disposed toward defendants 
who express sympathy."41 Others, however, "fear that a statement of 
sympathy will be mistaken for an assumption of culpability [and] do 
not issue" even these partial apologies.42 
C. Statutorily Protected Apologies 
Such concerns have led some to argue that apologies ought to be 
rendered safe by preventing them, through the rules of evidence, from 
being admissible in court as evidence of liability.43 In recent years, 
several states have adopted rules of evidence that offer such 
protection to certain apologies44 and a number of additional states 
have considered or are considering similar legislation.45 Such safe 
40. Rehm & Beatty, supra note 10. See also William K. Bartels, The Stormy Seas of 
Apologies: California Evidence Code Section 1160 Provides a Safe Harbor for Apologies 
Made A fter Accidents, 28 W. ST. U. L. REV. 141 (2000-01). 
41. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, supra note 3, at 1030. 
42 See Orenstein, supra note 3, at 240. This is, of course, an empirical question that 
awaits further research. For cases in which the admissibility or sufficiency of particular 
apologetic expressions was at issue, see, for example, Denton v. Park Hotel, 180 N.E.2d 70 
(Mass. 1962); Giangrasso v. Schimmel, 207 N.W.2d 517 (Neb. 1973); Phinney v. Vinson, 605 
A.2d 849 (Vt. 1992); and Senesac v. Assocs. in Obstetrics & Gynecology, 449 A.2d 900 (Vt. 
1982). 
43. See, e.g. , Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, supra note 3, at 1062-63; Jonathan R. 
Cohen, Legislating Apology: The Pros and Cons, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 819 (2002) (hereinafter 
Cohen, Legislating Apology]; Orenstein, supra note 3, at 247-48 (proposing to "except 
apologies and admissions of fault in civil cases."). See generally O'Hara & Yarn, supra note 
10. 
44. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1 160 (West Supp. 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-135 
(2003); FLA. STAT. ch. 90.4026 (2003); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 23D (2002); TEX. CIV. 
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.§ 18.061 (Vernon 2004); WASH. REV. CODE§ 5.66.010(1) (2002). 
45. See e.g. , S. 577, 2001 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2001); S. 1477, 21st Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Haw. 2001); S. 439, 92d Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2001); H.R. 1002, 1 12th Gen. 
Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2001); S. 1071, 79th Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. (Iowa 2001); S. 467, 
2001 Gen. Assem., 415th Sess. (Md. 2001); S. 528, 92d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2003); S. 280, 
92d Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2003); Draft Bill 1000, 2003 Leg., 58th Sess. (Mont. 
2003) (draft bill never formally introduced); S. 1262, 48th Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2002); S. 339, 
2003 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2003); H.R. 6905, 2002 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. (R.l. 
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harbors have been said to encourage parties to apologize and, 
consequently, to promote the settlement of civil cases.46 
In 1986, Massachusetts became the first state to adopt a rule of 
evidence designed to preclude admission of apologies. The 
Massachusetts statute provides that: 
Statements, writings or benevolent gestures expressing sympathy or a 
general sense of benevolence relating to the pain, suffering or death of a 
person involved in an accident and made to such person or to the family 
of such person shall be inadmissible as evidence of an admission of 
liability in a civil action.47 
This provision renders inadmissible apologies that are expressions of 
sympathy (e.g., " I  am sorry that you are hurt"), but does not clearly 
address the admissibility of more fully apologetic expressions that also 
take responsibility for the injury-causing incident (e.g., "I am sorry 
that I hurt you"). 
Subsequently, several other states, including Texas (1999), 
California (2000), Florida (2001), and Washington (2002), have 
enacted rules of evidence protecting apologies that are expressions of 
sympathy from being admissible at trial.48 The Florida statute, for 
example, protects statements expressing sympathy from admissibility 
but makes it clear that statements acknowledging fault remain 
admissible: 
The portion of statements, writings, or benevolent gestures expressing 
sympathy or a general sense of benevolence relating to the pain, 
suffering, or death of a person involved in an accident and made to that 
person or to the family of that person shall be inadmissible as evidence in 
a civil action. A statement of fault, however, which is part of, or in 
2002); H.R. 5628, 2001 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. (R.l. 2001); H.R. 67, 103d Gen. Assem., 1st 
Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2003); H.R. 2185, 102d Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2002); S. 587, 
75th Leg., 1st Sess. (W. Va. 2001). A handful of cases also provide some implicit protection 
for certain apologetic expressions. See, e.g., Denton, 180 N.E.2d 70 (Mass. 1962) (finding that 
defendant's apology was an expression of sympathy and should not have been admitted); 
Giangrasso, 207 N.W.2d at 518 ("The word 'sorry' in conjunction with other language or 
circumstances may constitute an admission, denoting apology. Standing alone, it is not an 
admission of negligence; it may mean regret, not apology. The statement was not an 
admission of negligence, and the evidence would have been insufficient to support a verdict 
for plaintiff."); Phinney, 605 A.2d 849 (Vt. 1992) (finding that a defendant's apology was 
insufficient to show a breach of the standard of care); Senesac, 449 A.2d 900 (Vt. 1982) 
(same). 
46. See Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, supra note 3; Cohen, Legislating Apology, 
supra note 43; Latif, supra note 37; Orenstein, supra note 3; Shuman, The Role of Apology in 
Tort Law, supra note 3. 
47. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 230 (2002). 
48. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1160 (West Supp. 1995); FLA. STAT. ch. 90.4026 (Supp. 2004); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 230 (2002); TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 18.061 
(Vernon 2004); WASH. REV. CODE§ 5.66.010(1) (1995). 
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addition to, any of the above shall be admissible pursuant to this 
section.49 
While most of this legislation specifically protects expressions of 
sympathy and does not protect statements that admit fault,50 some 
have argued that such protection ought to also be afforded to full 
apologies that accept responsibility.51 Most recently, in 2003 Colorado 
adopted a rule that appears to take a step in this direction. The 
Colorado rule provides: 
In any civil action brought by an alleged victim of an unanticipated 
outcome of medical care, or in any arbitration proceeding related to such 
civil action, any and all statements, affirmations, gestures, or conduct 
expressing apology, fault, sympathy, commiseration, condolence, 
49. FLA. STAT. ch. 90.4026(2) (Supp. 2004). The California, Washington, and Texas 
statutes are substantially similar to the Florida statute. The Washington statute closely tracks 
the Florida statute in providing: 
The portion of statements, writings, or benevolent gestures expressing sympathy or a general 
sense of benevolence relating to the pain, suffering, or death of a person involved in an 
accident, and made to that person or to the family of that person, shall be inadmissible as 
evidence in a civil action. A statement of fault, however, which is part of, or in addition to, 
any of the above shall not be made inadmissible by this section. 
WASH. REV. CODE§ 5.66.010(1) (2002). Similarly, the California statute provides: 
The portion of statements, writings, or benevolent gestures expressing sympathy or a general 
sense of benevolence relating to the pain, suffering, or death of a person involved in an 
accident and made to that person or to the family of that person shall be inadmissible as 
evidence of an admission of liability in a civil action. A statement of fault, however, which is 
part of, or in addition to, any of the above shall not be inadmissible pursuant to this section. 
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1160(a) (West Supp. 1995). The Historical Notes to the California 
statute include hypothetical examples that make clear the intentions of the drafters that 
statements admitting fault will still be admissible: 
Hypothetical #1: An automobile accident occurs and one driver says to the other: "I'm 
sorry you were hurt. "-or-"l'm sorry that your car was damaged." Under the bill, these 
statements would not be admissible in court. 
Hypothetical #2: The same accident occurs and one driver says to the other: "I'm sorry you 
were hurt, the accident was all my fault."-or- "l'm sorry you were hurt, I was using my cell 
phone and just didn't see you coming." Under the bill, only the portions of the statements 
containing the apology would be inadmissible; any other expression acknowledging or 
implying fault would continue to be admissible, consistent with present evidentiary 
standards. 
CAL. ASSEMBL y COMM. ON JUDICIARY, HISTORICAL NOTES TO CAL. Evm. CODE § 1160 
(West Supp. 1995). The Texas statute provides: 
(a) A court in a civil action may not admit a communication that: (1) expresses sympathy or 
a general sense of benevolence relating to the pain, suffering, or death of an individual 
involved in an accident; (2) is made to the individual or a person related to the individual ... 
and (3) is offered to prove liability of the communicator in relation to the individual. . .. (c) 
Notwithstanding the provisions of Subsections (a) and (b), a communication .. . which also 
includes a statement or statements concerning negligence or culpable conduct pertaining to 
an accident or event, is admissible to prove liability of the communicator. 
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.§ 18.061 (Vernon 2004). 
50. See CAL. EVID. CODE§ 1160 (West 1995); FLA. STAT. ch. 90.4026 (2002); TEX. CIV. 
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.§ 18.061 (Vernon 2004); WASH. REV. CODE§ 5.66.010(1) (1995). 
51. Orenstein, supra note 3; see also Cohen, Legislating Apology, supra note 43. 
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compassion, or a general sense of benevolence which are made by a 
health care provider or an employee of a health care provider to the 
alleged victim, a relative of the alleged victim, or a representative of the 
alleged victim and which related to the discomfort, pain, suffering, injury, 
or death of the alleged victim as the result of the unanticipated outcome 
of medical care shall be inadmissible as evidence of an admission of 
liability or as evidence of an admission against interest.52 
While the Colorado rule is limited in scope to expressions made by 
health-care providers, the provision is notable in that it appears to be 
the first statute that explicitly protects statements expressing fault.53 
D. Debate over Perceptions of Safe Apologies 
How these safe apologies - either those made safe through 
careful wording or those that are statutorily protected - will be 
perceived has been a subject of some controversy but little empirical 
examination. First, it is the intuition of many that a partial, or 
sympathy-only, apology is less satisfying and less effective at 
promoting settlement than a more complete apology in which the 
other party not only expresses sympathy, but also accepts 
responsibility for having caused injury.54 Something seems to be lost 
when a wrongdoer fails to acknowledge wrongdoing. Thus, Steven 
Scher and John Darley comment that " [t]he admission of 
responsibility for the transgression is a necessary gesture of an apology 
because it conveys to the listener that the speaker is aware of the 
social norms that have been violated . . .  , and therefore conveys that 
the speaker will be able to avoid the offense in future interactions."55 
Similarly, while recognizing that allowing apologies to be 
introduced against the apologizer in a subsequent legal proceeding 
52. COLO. REV. STAT.§ 13-25-135 (2003). 
53. The Colorado legislation, widely viewed as being part of a "concerted effort" of tort 
reform in Colorado, was billed by its sponsors as the "I'm sorry legislation," while criticized 
by opponents as being anti-patient rights by insulating doctors from liability. Arthur Kane, 
GOP Pushes Tort Reform, DENVER POST, Apr. 6, 2003, at B4 (characterizing the bill as part 
of a "flurry of bills to limit lawsuits and damage awards"); Al Lewis, Malpractice Measure is 
"Sorry" Protection, DENVER POST, Apr. 13, 2003, at Kl (describing the bill as "among a 
dozen tort reform proposals"); Peggy Lowe, "Sorry" Bill Advances, ROCKY MOUNTAIN 
NEWS, Apr. 2, 2003, at 22A (describing the different characterizations of the bill by its 
sponsors and opponents). Also in 2003, the Texas legislature considered, as part of a larger 
tort reform package, a measure that would have repealed the provision in its statute that 
makes clear that statements that acknowledge fault remain admissible. H.R. 4, 78th Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2003) (March 28, 2003 version). This provision, however, did not make it 
into the final version of the bill that was signed by the governor. H.R. 4, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Tex. 2003) (June 11 ,  2003, enacted version). 
54. See Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, supra note 3; Levi, supra note 3. 
55. Scher & Darley, supra note 19, at 130. See also O'Hara & Yarn, supra note 10, at 
1 137 ("The more unambiguously and emphatically a transgressor accepts blameworthiness, 
the more likely the apology will induce meaningful reconciliation."). 
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may have a chilling effect on such expressions of remorse, some 
commentators argue that avoiding the legal consequences of 
apologizing, either by offering a partial apology or because the 
apology is legally protected from admissibility, diminishes the 
apology's moral content.56 Thus, Lee Taft argues that: 
The law recognizes that an apology, when authentically and freely made, 
is an admission; it is an unequivocal statement of wrongdoing. The law 
permits such an acknowledgement to enter the legal process as a way to 
allow the performer of apology to experience the full consequences of 
the wrongful act. An apology made in this context, with full knowledge 
of the legal ramifications, is much more freighted than an apology made 
in a purely social context.57 
Accordingly, Taft argues that when an apology is inadmissible to show 
liability, "the moral dimension of apology is entirely eclipsed."58 In 
other words, to protect an apology or to make it safe is to diminish it 
and to change its meaning. Moreover, Cohen argues that " [t]o many 
the message, 'I'm sorry, but I don't want anything I'm saying to be 
used against me to make me pay for it,' rings empty. Many may think 
that if you are unwilling to 'put your money where your mouth is' you 
are insincere. "59 Such interpretation could lead recipients to discount 
safe apologies, rendering them ineffective. 
Others, however, make the case for carefully crafted apologies and 
increased evidentiary protection for apologies, arguing that even 
legally safe apologies are socially useful and can promote settlement, 
particularly where more complete apologies are unlikely to be 
forthcoming.60 "While most people would prefer receiving an apology 
that involves financial exposure to one that does not, I think most 
people would prefer receiving an apology that does not involve 
financial exposure to receiving no apology at all."61 Thus, proponents 
of protecting apologies argue that " [b ]ecause apologies are so crucial 
to social interaction and personal peace, it is desirable that law 
facilitate or, at least, not hinder the possibility of this healing ritual."62 
56. See Taft, supra note 7. See also arguments articulated in Cohen, Legislating 
Apology, supra note 43. 
57. Taft, supra note 7, at 1 157. 
58. Id. at 1 150. 
59. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, supra note 3, at 1067. 
60. Id. ; Cohen, Legislating Apology, supra note 43; Latif, supra note 37; Orenstein, 
supra note 3. 
61. Cohen, Legislating Apology, supra note 43, at 858. 
62. Orenstein, supra note 3, at 247. 
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Given recent calls for apologies in civil litigation and efforts to 
reform the law to protect them, it is important to know whether and in 
what ways apologies really do influence settlement decisionmaking. 
Such an understanding will better equip courts and legislatures to 
draft sensible and effective rules. In addition, such information will 
help parties to a dispute more clearly understand the utility of 
apologies for resolving disputes or, perhaps more importantly, for 
resolving disputes more quickly63 or more satisfactorily.64 
A. Psychological Responses to Apologies 
A variety of perceptions and attributions are thought to underlie 
negotiation behavior and to influence the outcomes of settlement 
negotiations.65 Experimental studies in primarily nonlegal contexts 
have demonstrated that an apology or an expression of remorse may 
influence a number of these perceptual and attributional judgments. 
Apologies or expressions of remorse have been found to influence 
attributions of responsibility or blame for the incident,66 beliefs about 
the stability of the behavior (i.e., its likelihood of recurrence ),67 
expectations about the future relationship between the parties,68 
perceptions of the character of the wrongdoer,69 affective reactions 
63. Heise found that the median disposition time for a civil case from the time of filing 
to a jury verdict was over two years. Michael Heise, Justice Delayed?: An Empirical Analysis 
of Civil Case Disposition Time, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 813 (2000). Given the tendency of 
many filed cases to settle late in the process, see Metzloff, supra note 4, at 59 & n.54, the 
settlement process may be protracted even for cases that will ultimately be resolved by 
settlement. 
64. See Chris Guthrie & James Levin, A "Party Satisfaction " Perspective on a 
Comprehensive Mediation Statute, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 885 (1998); infra notes 
237-242 and accompanying text. But cf Galanter & Cahill, supra note 4; David Luban, The 
Quality of Justice, 66 DENY. U. L. REV. 381 (1989). 
65. See generally Leigh Thompson, Negotiation Behavior and Outcomes: Empirical 
Evidence and Theoretical Issues, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 515, 527 (1990). 
66. See, e.g. , Darby & Schlenker, Children's Reactions to Apologies, supra note 19; 
Darby & Schlenker, Children's Reactions to Transgressions, supra note 19; Ohbuchi et al., 
supra note 19; Ohbuchi & Sato, supra note 19; Scher & Darley, supra note 19; Weiner et al., 
supra note 19. 
67. See, e.g. , Gregg J. Gold & Bernard Weiner, Remorse, Confession, Group Identity, 
and Expectancies About Repeating a Transgression, 22 BASIC & APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 
291 (2000); Ohbuchi et al., supra note 19; Jennifer R. Orleans & Michael B. Gurtman, 
Effects of Physical Attractiveness and Remorse on Evaluations of Transgressions, 6 ACAD. 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 49 (1984); Weiner et al., supra note 19. 
68. Holley S. Hodgins & Elizabeth Liebeskind, Apology Versus Defense: Antecedents 
and Consequences, 39 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 297 (2003). 
69. See, e.g. , Darby & Schlenker, Children 's Reactions to Apologies, supra note 19; 
Darby & Schlenker, Children's Reactions to Transgressions, supra note 19; Gold & Weiner, 
supra note 67; Marti Hope Gonzales et al., Victims as "Narrative Critics": Factors Influencing 
Rejoinders and Evaluative Responses to Offenders' Accounts, 20 PERSONALITY & Soc. 
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such as anger and sympathy,70 and behaviors such as forgiveness,71 
aggression,72 and recommendations for punishment.73 
Experimental studies of reactions to criminal defendants have 
generally shown that remorseful defendants are perceived more 
positively and sentenced more leniently than are defendants who do 
not show remorse.74 Similarly, Brian Bornstein found that defendants 
in civil trials who show remorse were perceived more positively by 
mock-jurors than those who did not.75 Each of these psychological 
reactions may underlie any effect of apology on settlement 
decisionmaking. 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 691 (1994); Ohbuchi et al., supra note 19; Ohbuchi & Sato, supra note 19; 
Orleans & Gurtman, supra note 67; Weiner et al. , supra note 19. 
70. See, e.g. , Mark Bennett & Deborah Earwaker, Victims' Response to Apologies: The 
Effects of Offender Responsibility and Offense Severity, 134 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 457 (1994); 
Gold & Weiner, supra note 67; Ohbuchi et al., supra note 19; Weiner et al., supra note 19. 
For a discussion of research in emotion in negotiation generally, see Max H. Bazerman et al., 
Negotiation, 51 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 279, 285-86 (2000). 
71. See, e.g., Darby & Schlenker, Children's Reactions to Apologies, supra note 19; Gold 
& Weiner, supra note 67; Ohbuchi & Sato, supra note 1 9; Weiner et al., supra note 19. 
72. See, e.g. , Ohbuchi et al., supra note 19. 
73. See, e.g. , Darby & Schlenker, Children's Reactions to Apologies, supra note 19; 
Darby & Schlenker, Children's Reactions to Transgressions, supra note 19; Gold & Weiner, 
supra note 67; Weiner et al., supra note 19. 
74. See Chris L. Kleinke et al. , Evaluation of a Rapist as a Function of Expressed Intent 
and Remorse, 132 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 525 (1992) (finding both that a convicted rapist was 
judged to have acted less intentionally, to be of less negative character, and to have more 
potential for rehabilitation if he demonstrated remorse than if he did not and that 
recommended sentences for the convicted rapist were predicted by perceived remorse); 
Randolph B. Pipes & Marci Alessi, Remorse and a Previously Punished Offense in 
Assignment of Punishment and Estimated Likelihood of a Repeated Offense, 85 PSYCHOL. 
REP. 246 (1999); Michael G. Rumsey, Effects of Defendant Background and Remorse on 
Sentencing Judgments, 6 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 64 (1976) (finding that participants gave 
a defendant in a drunk-driving case who was described as "extremely remorseful" a shorter 
sentence than they did a defendant who gave "no indication of remorse"); Christy Taylor & 
Chris L. Kleinke, Effects of Severity of Accident, History of Drunk Driving, Intent, and 
Remorse on Judgments of a Drunk Driver, 22 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 1641 (1992) 
(finding that a defendant who expressed remorse was rated as being a person of greater 
responsibility and sensitivity than a defendant who did not express remorse, but not finding 
significant differences in sentences). See the review of the role of apologies in criminal cases 
in Carrie J. Petrucci, Apology in the Criminal Justice Setting: Evidence for Including Apology 
as an Additional Component in the Legal System, 20 BEHA v. SCI. & L. 337 (2002). For some 
boundary conditions on these types of effects, see Keith E. Neidermeier et al., Exceptions to 
the Rule: The Effects of Remorse, Status, and Gender on Decision Making, 31 J. APPLIED 
Soc. PSYCHOL. 604 (2001 ). Interviews with jurors in capital cases also provide evidence that 
the degree to which jurors perceive defendants to be remorseful influences their choice 
between a sentence of life in prison and death. See Theodore Eisenberg et al., But Was He 
Sorry? The Role of Remorse in Capital Sentencing, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1599 (1998). 
75. Bornstein et al., supra note 17. In his first study, Bornstein found that remorse had a 
significant positive effect on jurors' overall perceptions of the defendant. Id. at 400. In a 
second study, Bornstein found that physicians who expressed remorse were perceived as 
having suffered more than defendants who did not express remorse. Id. at 404. But see 
Bornstein et al., supra note 17, for Bornstein's findings about damage awards. 
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More generally, research on the factors that lead injured parties to 
instigate and pursue legal claims suggests several avenues by which an 
apology might influence settlement behavior. Research investigating 
the claiming process suggests that the course of a dispute is in part 
determined by how the dispute is construed by the participants. 
Moreover, the research identifies a number of variables that affect the 
likelihood that injured persons will name their injury, blame a third 
party, and pursue a claim.76 Whether or not a legal claim is made is 
influenced by factors such as whether the injured person identifies an 
injury, attributes causation and fault to a third party, perceives that he 
or she has been treated unfairly, and knows how to go about pursuing 
a claim.77 Apologies may influence perceptions of fair versus unfair 
treatment, attributions of responsibility, and perceived dignity vis-a-vis 
the wrongdoer. In these ways, apologies may lead to greater 
willingness to settle claims and greater satisfaction with outcomes. 
Equity theory also suggests that apologies may be useful in 
facilitating settlement. Equity theory posits that a transgression by an 
offender against an injured party results in an inequity in their 
relationship; that is, the wrong creates a moral imbalance between the 
parties. Moreover, "when individuals find themselves participating in 
inequitable relationships, they become distressed. The more 
inequitable the relationship, the more distress individuals feel. "78 
Upon discovering that a relationship is inequitable, individuals are 
motivated to attempt to restore equity to the relationship.79 
Equity theorists have suggested a number of ways in which equity 
might be restored to the relationship between the parties, including 
the offender offering an apology.80 An apology may persuade the 
injured party that the relationship is, indeed, equitable,81 perhaps in 
part because it demonstrates that the wrongdoer has suffered as a 
result.82 To apologize is to engage in a social "ritual whereby the 
wrongdoer can symbolically bring himself low (or raise us up). "83 
76. See Felstiner et al., supra note 4; E. Allan Lind, Litigating and Claiming in 
Organizations: Antisocial Behavior or Quest for Justice? in ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOR IN 
ORGANIZATIONS 150 (R.A. Giacalone & J. Greenberg eds., 1997) (reviewing research). 
77. See DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN 
THE UNITED STATES (1991); Dan Coates & Steven Penrod, Social Psychology and the 
Emergence of Disputes, 15 LAW & Soc'y REV. 655 (1980-81); Felstiner et al., supra note 4; 
Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the Adversary 
Culture, 15 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 525 (1980-81). 
78. See Waister et al., supra note 11, at 153. 
79. See id. at 154. 
80. See id. at 163. 
81. See id. at 163. 
82 See William Austin et al., Equity and the Law: The Effect of a Harmdoer's "Suffering 
in the Act" on Liking and Assigned Punishment, 9 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 163 (1976); Dana Bramel et al., An Observer's Reaction to the Suffering of his 
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Accordingly, as sociologist Tavuchis recognizes: 
Genuine apologies . . . may be taken as the symbolic foci of secular 
remedial rituals that serve to recall and reaffirm allegiance to codes of 
behavior and belief whose integrity has been tested and challenged by 
transgression, whether knowingly or unwittingly. An apology thus speaks 
to an act that cannot be undone but that cannot go unnoticed without 
compromising the current and future relationship of the parties, the 
legitimacy of the violated rule, and the wider social web in which the 
participants are enmeshed.84 
Similarly, Jean Hampton argues that "by apologizing, we deny the 
diminishment of the victim, and our relative elevation, expressed by 
our wrongful action. "85 In this way, an apology offered by the 
transgressor to the victim may repair the breach created by the 
wrongful conduct and affirm the relative value of the parties. 
One empirically supported reason that an apology may be an 
effective repair strategy is that observers may infer from an apology 
that the cause of the incident is less stable and, therefore, less likely to 
be repeated.86 Gregg Gold and Bernard Weiner asked participants to 
read a scenario describing an incident that was followed by either an 
expression of remorse or no such expression.87 They found that 
wrongdoers who expressed remorse were judged to be of higher moral 
character and as less likely to act similarly in the future.88 Consistent 
with this notion, Randolph Pipes and Marci Alessi found that a 
criminal defendant who demonstrated remorse was perceived as less 
likely to reoffend than was a defendant who did not express remorse.89 
In addition, Dawn Robinson, Lynn Smith-Lovin, and Olga Tsoudis 
found that a criminal defendant who was perceived as more 
remorseful from his visible emotional reaction was rated as having 
engaged in the behavior at issue fewer times in the past and as less 
Enemy, 8 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 384 (1968); Jerry I. Shaw & James A. 
McMartin, Perpetrator or Victim? Effects of Who Suffers in an Automobile Accident on 
Judgmental Strictness, 3 Soc. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 5 (1975); Harry S. Upshaw & Daniel 
Romer, Punishment For One's Misdeeds as a Function of Having Suffered From Them, 2 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 162 (1976). 
83. Jeffrie Murphy, Forgiveness and Resentment, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 14, 28 
(Jean Hampton & Jeffrie G. Murphy eds., 1988). 
84. TA VU CHIS, supra note 30, at 13. 
85. Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 
39 UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1698 (1992). 
86. See, e.g. , FRITZ HEIDER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS 
(1958). 
87. Gold & Weiner, supra note 67. 
88. Id. Participants also expressed more sympathy for remorseful wrongdoers, were 
more likely to forgive them, and recommended less punishment. Id. 
89. Pipes & Alessi, supra note 74. 
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likely to engage in the behavior in the future.90 Gold and Weiner posit 
that " [o]ne reason for the anticipation of positive future behavior may 
be that when an individual confesses with remorse, the moral 
character of the offender is recovered," and the wrongful behavior is 
not seen as representative of the offender's true character.91 Many 
injured parties say that in pursuing lawsuits they are interested in 
effecting a change in the wrongdoer's future behavior and desire 
assurance that the wrongful behavior will not recur.92 If these self­
reports are accurate, then a recipient's interpretation of an apology as 
an indication that the behavior will not be repeated may predict 
willingness to settle. 
B. The Nature of the Apology 
Whether an apology is merely an expression of sympathy or also 
includes an acknowledgment of responsibility may affect its impact on 
its recipient. Several studies have demonstrated that more elaborate 
apologies result in improved attributions. Bruce Darby and Barry 
Schlenker evaluated children's responses to different apologies given 
following an incident.93 The children judged wrongdoers who offered 
more elaborate apologies more favorably, as better persons who they 
liked more, blamed less, were more willing to forgive, and thought 
should be punished less. 
More recently, Scher and Darley identified several potential 
components of an apology: the admission of responsibility, an 
expression of remorse, a promise of forbearance, and an offer of 
repair.94 They found that each of these components independently 
contributed to the effectiveness of the apology.95 Nevertheless, "the 
greatest improvement in perceptions came from the addition of one 
apology strategy - i.e., the offering of an apology, compared to no 
90. Dawn T. Robinson et al., Heinous Crime or Unfortunate Accident? The Effects of 
Remorse on Responses to Mock Criminal Confessions, 73 Soc. FORCES 175 (1994). These 
judgments were found, in turn, to influence sentencing decisions. Id. 
91 .  Gold & Weiner, supra note 67, at 292. Goffman suggests that the act of apologizing 
causes a "splitting of the self into a blameworthy part and a part that stands back and 
sympathizes with the blame giving, and, by implication, is worthy of being brought back into 
the fold." GOFFMAN, supra note 30, at 1 13. 
92. See Gallagher et al., supra note 12; Hickson et al., supra note 12; Vincent et al., supra 
note 12; Witman et al., supra note 12. 
93. Darby & Schlenker, Children's Reactions to Apologies, supra note 19. The authors 
compared reactions to no apology, a perfunctory "excuse me," an expression of remorse, 
and an apology with an offer of repair. Id. at 744. 
94. Scher & Darley, supra note 19, at 132. 
95. Id. at 133. The effectiveness of the apology was measured by adults' judgments 
about the appropriateness of the wrongdoer's response, how bad he felt, the degree to which 
he was to blame and would be condemned, and how reliable and conscientious he was. Id. 
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apology."96 This is consistent with the intuition that an apology that 
affirmatively accepts responsibility is probably most effective, but any 
apology, even one that merely expresses sympathy, may be better than 
nothing. 
C. Apologies and Legal Settlement 
Thus, in addition to the anecdotal evidence of the importance of 
apologies in legal-settlement negotiation, there is a growing body of 
empirical evidence that apologies can have important effects on a 
variety of judgments that may underlie legal-settlement decisions. 
There has been very little systematic investigation, however, of the 
particular effects of apologies on legal-settlement decisionmaking. 
Moreover, apologies offered in the course of a legal dispute are likely 
to involve a different dynamic than apologies offered in other 
contexts, and the constraints and influences of the legal system may 
influence how apologies are understood. 
Russell Korobkin and Chris Guthrie have conducted the only 
experimental study to examine the influence of apology on litigants' 
settlement decisions.97 They asked undergraduates to assume the role 
of the tenant in a landlord-tenant dispute over a broken furnace and 
to indicate their willingness to accept a settlement offer from the 
landlord. Some participants were told that "the landlord apologized to 
you for his behavior. 'I know this is not an acceptable excuse,' he told 
you, 'but I have been under a great deal of pressure lately.' " 
Participants who were told that they had received this apology from 
the landlord were marginally more likely to accept the offer than were 
participants who had not received the apology.98 
The Korobkin and Guthrie study provides an indication that 
apologies may have a role to play in settling legal disputes. Numerous 
questions, however, are left unanswered. First, as the authors noted, 
participants may not have considered the "apology" described in the 
study materials to be an actual apology, as it did not include the 
prototypical phrase "I'm sorry" and it included an excuse for the 
landlord's behavior.99 Second, the effects of different types of 
apologies and the effects of different evidentiary rules remain 
96. Id. at 137; see also Donald E. Conlon & Noel M. Murray, Customer Perceptions of 
Corporate Responses to Product Complaints: The Role of Explanations, 39 ACAD. MGMT. J. 
1040, 1042 (1996) (discussing apologies in the consumer-complaint context). 
97. Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement: 
An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107 (1994) [hereinafter Korobkin & Guthrie, 
Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement]. 
98. Id. at 148 (describing a marginally statistically significant result at the p < .1 level). 
99. Id. at 149 n.176. See also supra note 30 and accompanying text (distinguishing 
excuses and apologies). 
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unexplored. Finally, in addition to exploring participants' willingness 
to accept a particular offer of settlement, it would be useful to inquire 
into a broader range of the parties' underlying attributions and 
perceptions in order to more fully understand the role of apologies in 
legal settlement. 
Cognitive approaches to understanding negotiation posit that a 
central aspect of negotiation is how the parties to the negotiation 
perceive, interpret, and understand the context of the negotiation, the 
other party, and themselves_HJO Importantly for present purposes, 
negotiator perceptions are not necessarily static - participation in the 
process and interaction between the parties to the negotiation can 
shape perceptions.101 As Felstiner, Abel, and Sarat have noted, 
"disputes are not things: they are social constructs."102 Thus, an 
apology might operate to influence settlement decisionmaking by 
altering the injured party's perceptions of the situation, the other 
party, or the offer itself.103 
It is important to consider these reactions for two distinct reasons. 
First, because it is thought that apologies may lead to dispute 
resolution indirectly through the apologies' effects on the parties' 
construal of the situation, the mechanisms by which an apology might 
lead to greater willingness to settle ought to be explored. Thus, 
100. See Bazerman et al., supra note 70, at 281; Max H. Bazerman & John S. Carroll, 
Negotiator Cognition, 9 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 247, 268 (1987); John S. Carroll & 
John W. Payne, An Information Processing Approach to Two-Party Negotiations, 3 RES. 
NEGOTIATION ORG. 3, 8 (1991); Margaret A. Neale & Gregory B. Northcraft, Behavioral 
Negotiation Theory: A Framework for Conceptualizing Dyadic Bargaining, 13 RES. 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 147, 165 (1991); Thompson, supra note 65, at 527; Leigh 
Thompson & Reid Hastie, Social Perception in Negotiation, 47 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 
& HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 98 (1990). 
101. Carroll & Payne, supra note 100, at 8 ("During this process, preferences and 
aspirations may change, facts may be revealed or reinterpreted, and new issues arise."); 
Thompson, supra note 65, at 528. 
102. Felstiner et al., supra note 4, at 631. 
103. For example, an apology that changes a party's construal of the situation or the 
other party may also change the party's reactions, posturing, or communication. See Michael 
W. Morris et al., Misperceiving Negotiation Counterparts: When Situationally Determined 
Bargaining Behaviors Are Attributed to Personality Traits, 77 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. 
PSYCHOL. 52, 52 (1999) ("Conflict theorists have suggested that a negotiator's attributions 
for a counterpart's behavior exert a pivotal influence on the negotiator's strategic decisions." 
(citation omitted)); see also Donald G. Gifford, The Synthesis of Legal Counseling and 
Negotiation Models: Preserving Client-Centered Advocacy in the Negotiation Context, 34 
UCLA L. REV. 811, 830 (1987) (recognizing legal negotiation as a "cyclical process" during 
which perceptions and goals may evolve). Neale and Northcraft write: 
There is a more global sense in which negotiator's information processing strategies 
influence the processes and outcomes of negotiation. Negotiator cognition is the lens 
through which negotiation occurs . . . .  Negotiators do more than just process (perhaps 
incorrectly) information about the context in which negotiations occur. Negotiators also 
perceive that context, and react to their perceptions in ways that validate or enact those 
perceptions. Thus, it is negotiators' cognitions which contextualize negotiations. 
Neale & Northcraft, supra note 100, at 169. 
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participants' perceptions and attributions, affective reactions, and 
willingness to forgive are of interest as variables which may mediate 
any effects of apologies on decisions to accept or reject a particular 
settlement offer. Second, it is likely that apologies may not always (or 
even frequently) result in the settlement of a dispute through their 
effect on the acceptance of a particular settlement offer. Rather, an 
apology may favorably change the dynamics of the negotiation to 
smooth the way toward an eventual settlement - a settlement that 
may come more quickly or be more satisfactory as a result of the 
apology - even if the apology does not convince the victim to accept 
the immediate offer of settlement.104 
III. THE PRESENT STUDIES 
While many have become convinced of the value of an apology in 
the legal context, it can be seen from the above review that there is a 
paucity of empirical studies examining the legal effects of 
apologizing. 105 This Part reports several original experimental studies 
that were designed to begin systematic study of these effects. 
In a typical experiment, a large number of participants evaluate the 
same simulated case. All aspects of the case (e.g., the factual situation 
and the settlement offer) are held constant, except the manipulated 
variable that is of interest in the study (e.g., the nature of the apology 
offered).106 Then, all participants are asked the same set of questions 
(e.g., a question about how likely they would be to accept the offer). 
Experimental simulation methods afford several benefits for 
studying the role of apologies in legal-settlement negotiation. First, 
there is often no record of the millions of settlement negotiations that 
occur in civil cases each year, some of which may involve apologies.107 
Using experimental simulations is a useful way to begin this systematic 
study of the effects of apologies on settlement decisionmaking. 
104. See Bazerman & Carroll, supra note 100, at 249 (describing "sequences of 
interaction over time during negotiation"); Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators' 
Orientations, Strategies, and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 
7, 20 (1996) (arguing that "participants often must address the relational and emotional 
aspects of their interactions in order to pave the way for settlement of the narrower 
economic issues"). 
105. On the dearth of empirical studies examining legal-settlement negotiation generally 
or the legal effects of apologies in particular, see generally Cohen, Legislating Apology, 
supra note 43; Korobkin & Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement, supra 
note 97; Shuman, The Role of Apology in Tort Law, supra note 3; and John 0. Haley, 
Comment: The Implications of Apology, 20 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 499, 506 (1986). 
106. Thus, for example, participants might all be exposed to identical descriptions of an 
injury-causing incident and would receive the same offer of settlement. Different groups of 
participants, however, would be provided with different information about their 
communication with the offender. 
107. See Waldmeir, supra note 18, at 8. 
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Second, experimental simulation allows the researcher to obtain the 
reactions of a large number of people to the same factual scenario. 
Third, because all factors except the variable of interest are controlled, 
any observed differences in the responses of participants who 
evaluated cases involving different levels of the manipulated variable 
can be attributed to that variable, unconfounded by other 
influences. 108 
In each study, participants were asked to visit a website and read a 
scenario describing an incident in which one party was injured.109 
Respondents were asked to take on the role of the injured person and 
to evaluate a settlement offer (covering out-of-pocket costs) from the 
other party. In addition to their willingness to accept the settlement 
offer, respondents were asked to indicate their assessment of the 
sufficiency of the apology; the motives they ascribed to the other 
party; their assessment of the nature of the injuries, the other party's 
conduct and character, and each party's responsibility for causing the 
incident; their degree of anger at, sympathy for, and willingness to 
forgive the other party; and their assessment of how the incident 
would likely affect the relationship and the other party's conduct in 
the future.110 
108. Ideally, the results reported here will converge with results from research 
examining reactions of litigants in actual cases if and when such research is conducted. 
Research using actual litigants in actual cases has the benefit of realism, but the researcher is 
unable to control the myriad factors that make cases differ from one another, making the 
isolation of the variable of interest impracticable. See Coates & Penrod, supra note 77, at 667 
("[T]hese studies [of actual cases] measure rather than manipulate variables, with the 
consequence that clear causal inferences are impossible to make."). For a discussion of 
simulation research, see generally Brian H. Bornstein, The Ecological Validity of Jury 
Simulations: ls the Jury Still Out?, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 75 (1999); Robert M. Bray & 
Norbert L. Kerr, Use of the Simulation Method in the Study of Jury Behavior: Some 
Methodological Considerations, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 107 (1979); Shari Seidman 
Diamond, Illuminations and Shadows from Jury Simulations, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHA v. 561 
(1997); Robert MacCoun, Inside the Black Box: What Empirical Research Tells Us About 
Decisionmaking by Civil Juries, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 137 
(Robert E. Litan ed., 1993); Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Evaluating Empirical Research 
Methods: Using Empirical Research in Law and Policy, 81 NEB. L. REV. 777 (2002); Wayne 
Weiten & Shari Seidman Diamond, A Critical Review of the Jury Simulation Paradigm: The 
Case of Defendant Characteristics, 3 LA w & HUM. BEHA v. 71, 75-83 (1979). For examples of 
simulation research in legal settlement negotiation, see, for example, Mark Kelman et al., 
Context-Dependence in Legal Decision Making, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 287 (1996); Korobkin & 
Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement, supra note 97; Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. 
& Neil Vidmar, Empirical Research on Offers of Settlement: A Preliminary Report, L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1988, at 13. 
109. In each of the studies described here, university staff members were randomly 
selected from a university directory and were recruited by direct e-mail solicitation to 
participate in the study. Thus, the resulting samples, which did not include students or 
faculty, included a wide range of participants who could potentially find themselves in the 
position of a person injured in an accident - participants included, for example, secretarial 
and administrative staff, maintenance and grounds staff, athletic staff, food service staff, 
library staff, and staff employed by the university-affiliated radio and television stations. 
110. After they submitted their responses, participants were asked to provide 
identifying information so that they could receive payment; these responses were sent to a 
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A. Effects of Apologies on Settlement Decisionmaking 
The first study examined recipients' interpretations of apologies 
and the effects of those apologies on willingness to accept a settlement 
offer in the dispute. The hypothetical scenario detailed a relatively 
simple personal-injury dispute: a pedestrian-bicycle accident.1 1 1  All 
participants reviewed this scenario and evaluated the same settlement 
offer. 
Control participants evaluated a version of the scenario in which 
no apology was offered. Additional participants evaluated versions of 
the scenario in which two variables, the nature of the apology offered 
and the nature of the applicable evidentiary rule, were varied. First, 
the nature of the apology offered was varied to compare the effects of 
a partial apology, in which the other party merely expressed sympathy 
for the potential claimant's injuries, with the effects of a full apology, 
in which he or she also took responsibility for causing the injuries.112 
Second, the evidentiary rule described to participants was varied to 
examine how different evidentiary rules influence the interpretation 
and effectiveness of an apology, comparing respondents' reactions to 
an apology where the evidentiary rules protected the apology, where 
the evidentiary rules did not protect the apology, and where no 
evidentiary rule was described.1 13 Thus, there were seven different 
variations of the basic scenario.1 14 One hundred forty-five people 
separate data file and were not linked with participants' substantive responses. For the few 
individuals who wanted to participate in the study but were limited in their web access, hard 
copies of the study materials were sent and returned via campus mail. 
111 .  The hypothetical included evidence that the offender, described as someone from 
the injured party's neighborhood with whom the injured party was acquainted, had been 
riding quite fast, had been reaching for a water bottle, and had almost hit another pedestrian 
shortly before the incident. The resulting injuries included a broken arm that required 
surgery and a pin to set the fracture, bruised ribs, and numerous bruises and scratches. 
1 12. The offender who offered a partial apology stated, in relevant part: "I am so sorry 
that you were hurt. I really hope that you feel better soon." The offender who offered a full 
apology stated: "I am so sorry that you were hurt. The accident was all my fault. I was going 
too fast and not watching where I was going until it was too late." In both cases, the apology 
was offered shortly after the accident, prior to the filing of a lawsuit. 
1 13. This variable was manipulated by describing an over-the-fence conversation with 
another neighbor who was an attorney. In the condition in which the apology was protected, 
the neighbor/attorney described "a new rule preventing apologies from being used against 
defendants in court," that the offender's statement "will not be admissible in court to prove 
that [the offender] was at fault for the accident," and that the attorney "had a conversation 
with [the offender] immediately after the accident and had mentioned to [the offender] that 
if she apologized it couldn't be used against her if there was a lawsuit." In the condition in 
which the apology was explicitly not protected, the neighbor/attorney explained that the 
offender's statement "could be introduced in court to prove [the offender] was at fault" and 
that the attorney "had a conversation with [the offender) immediately after the accident and 
had mentioned to [the offender) that if she apologized it could be used against her if there 
was a lawsuit." 
1 14. Thus, the study used a 2 (apology) x 3 (evidentiary rule) factorial design with an 
additional no-apology control condition. 
December 2003] Apologies and Legal Settlement 485 
participated in the study and were randomly assigned to the 
experimental conditions. 1 1 5  
1 .  Effects of Apology on Settlement 
The first set of analyses compared the two different types of 
apology (partial and full) to the no-apology control where no 
evidentiary rule was specified. It was predicted that the nature of the 
apology would influence participants' settlement decisions. Moreover, 
based on the previous research on the psychological effects of 
apologies, it was predicted that an apology would influence settlement 
decisionmaking through its effects on participants' perceptions and 
attributions. That is, participants' interpretations of the apology, their 
affective reactions, and their evaluations of the situation and the 
offender were expected to mediate the effects of an apology on their 
settlement decisions: the nature of the apology would influence these 
perceptions and attributions, which would in tum influence settlement 
decisions.1 16 
a. · Effect of Apology on Settlement Decisions. First, even though all 
participants were told that they had suffered the same injuries and 
received the same offer of settlement, the nature of the apology 
offered influenced recipients' willingness to accept the offer. 1 17  These 
results are presented in Figure 1. When no apology was offered 52% 
1 15. Participants ranged in age from twenty-one to seventy (mean = 40); thirty percent 
of the participants were male. 
1 16. As Baron and Kenny describe, "In general, a given variable may be said to function 
as a mediator to the extent that it accounts for the relation between the predictor and the 
criterion. [M]ediators explain how external physical events take on internal psychological 
significance . . . .  Mediators speak to how or why such effects occur." Reuben M. Baron & 
David A. Kenny, The Moderator-Mediator Variable Distinction in Social Psychological 
Research: Conceptual, Strategic, and Statistical Considerations, 51 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. 
PSYCHOL. 1 173, 1 176 (1986). In order to establish a mediating relationship, four 
requirements must be established. First, the initial variable (e.g., apology) must be 
correlated with the outcome variable (e.g., settlement decisions). Second, the initial variable 
must be correlated with the proposed mediator (e.g., perceptions and attributions). Third, 
the proposed mediator must be correlated with the outcome variable. And, finally, the direct 
effect of the initial variable on the outcome variable must be diminished upon controlling for 
the proposed mediator. Id. at 1176-77. 
1 17. i (4) = 13.388, p = .OJ. Regression analysis measures the relationships between a 
set of predictor variables and a dependent variable. Because the settlement rate variable 
consisted of three categories (settle, not settle, and unsure), this variable was analyzed using 
multinomial logistic regression. See V ANI K. BOROOAH, LOGIT AND PROB IT: ORDERED 
AND MULTINOMIAL MODELS (2002); TIM FuTJNG LIAO, INTERPRETING PROBABILITY 
MODELS: LOGIT, PROBIT, AND OTHER GENERALIZED LINEAR MODELS (1994); SCOTI 
MENARD, APPLIED LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS (1995). Throughout this Article 
differences are considered to be "statistically significant" if the statistical test used indicates 
that the likelihood that the difference would occur by chance is less than 5% (reported by 
the p-value as p < .05). Differences are reported as "marginally significant" if the likelihood 
of such a difference occurring by chance is greater than 5% but less than 10%. See generally 
BARBARA G. TABACHNICK & LINDA S. FIDELL, USING MULTIVARIATE STATISTICS (2d ed. 
1989). 
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of respondents indicated that they would definitely or probably accept 
the offer, while 43 % would definitely or probably rej ect the offer and 
5 % were unsure. When a partial apology was offered, only 35 % of 
respondents were inclined to accept the offer, 25% were inclined to 
reject it, and 40% indicated that they were unsure. In contrast, when a 
full apology was offered, 73 % of respondents were inclined to accept 
the offer, with only 13-14% each inclined to reject it or remaining 
unsure. 
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Comparing each type o f  apology t o  the condition i n  which no 
apology was received, receiving a partial apology increased the 
likelihood that the respondent would be unsure about how to respond 
to the settlement offer,118 and receiving a full apology increased the 
likelihood that the respondent would choose to accept the offer119 and 
decreased the likelihood that the respondent would choose to reject 
the off er.120 
b. The Role of Perceptions and Attributions. Next, the study 
examined the effects of the nature of the apology on a number of 
constructs thought to underlie the effect of apology on settlement 
decisionmaking. Where there were differences in participants' 
responses across conditions, the differences follow a strikingly similar 
pattern: offering no apology or a partial apology elicited equivalent 
responses that were both different from the responses elicited when a 
118. As compared to no apology, a partial apology increased the likelihood that the 
respondent would be unsure rather than either accept (p = .030) or reject (p = .026) the 
offer. 
119. As compared to no apology, a full apology increased the likelihood that the 
respondent would accept the offer rather than reject it (p = .057) or be unsure (p = .553). 
120. As compared to no apology, a full apology marginally decreased the likelihood that 
the respondent would reject the offer rather than accept it (p = .057) or be unsure (p = .099). 
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full apology was offered.121 The average ratings for variables on which 
an apology had a significant effect are displayed in Table 1 .  
TABLE 1 




Sufficient apology 1.90. 2.30· 3.82b 
Regret 2.86. 2.63. 4.14b 
Moral character 2.65. 2.70· 3.86b 
Careful in future 3.5o· 3.3o· 4.18b 
Belief that responsible 2.86. 3.oo· 4.68b 
Bad Conduct 4.o5· 3.85. 3.lOb 
Sympathy 1.57" 1 .65. 2.60b 
Anger 3.n· 3.74. 2.86b 
Forgiveness 3.62· 3.85. 4.23. 
Damage to Relationship 3.29. 3.5o· 2.00b 
Offer make up for injury 2.52· 2.35. 3.55b 
Note: All constructs were measured on 5 point scales; higher numbers represent "more" of 
the construct. For each rating, means with different superscripts differ significantly (p < .05). 
Thus, a full apology was viewed as more sufficient than either a 
partial apology or no apology.122 An offender who offered a full 
apology was seen as experiencing more regret, 123 as more moral, 124 and 
as more likely to be careful in the future125 than one offering a partial 
or no apology. While an offender offering a full apology was seen as 
believing that he or she was more responsible for the incident than 
121. A multivariate analysis of variance ("MANOV A") conducted on participants' 
assessments of the case and the other party revealed a significant multivariate effect of 
apology (F(28,72) = 1.642, p = .048). MANOVA measures the likelihood that observed 
differences between groups on a combination of measures are due to actual differences on 
those measures. See generally TABACHNICK & FIDELL, supra note 1 17, at 371-72. Follow-up 
analyses of variance ("ANOV A") were conducted for each variable separately; it is these 
univariate effects that are presented in Table 1. ANOV A measures the likelihood that 
observed differences among a set of means are due to actual differences among the groups 
as opposed to chance. See TABACHNICK & FIDELL, supra note 1 17, at 37. Except where 
otherwise noted, all post-hoc ps < .05. 
122. F(2,59) = 15. 790, p < .001. 
123. F(2,59) = 9.578, p < .001. 
124. F(2,59) = 9.065, p < .001. 
125. F(2,59) = 6.959, p = .002. 
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one who offered a partial or no apology, 126 the conduct of the full 
apologizer was judged more favorably than that of offenders who 
offered either a partial or no apology.127 Participants expressed greater 
sympathy and less anger at the offender who offered a full apology 
than they did at offenders who offered either a partial or no 
apology.128 Participants also indicated more willingness to forgive an 
offender who gave a full apology than they did for offenders offering a 
partial or no apology129 and expected that less damage to the parties' 
relationship would result following a full apology than they did 
following a partial or no apology.°° Finally, participants indicated that 
the settlement offer would better make up for their injuries when they 
had received a full apology than when they had received either a 
partial or no apology.131 
To facilitate further analysis, two scales were constructed from 
these measures132 that represented participants' overall assessments of 
the apologies133 and their evaluations of the offer.134 Consistent with 
126. F(2,59) = 15.578, p < .001. 
127. F(2,58) = 4.645, p = .013. 
128. F(2,58) = 7.317, p = .001 and F(2,59) = 3.858, p = .027, respectively. 
129. F(2,60) = 4.150, p = .021. Post-hoc tests for this variable showed only a marginally 
significant difference (p = .086) between offenders who offered full and partial apologies. 
130. F(2,58) = 9.840, p < .001. 
131. F(2,60) = 5.865, p = .005. 
132. The groups of variables to be included in each scale were determined by a principal 
components factor analysis. Factor analysis is a procedure that is used to determine whether 
a larger number of variables cluster together into a smaller number of constructs. The 
procedure is "applied to a single set of variables where the researcher is interested in 
discovering which variables in the set form coherent subsets that are relatively independent 
of one another. Variables that are correlated with one another but largely independent of 
other subsets of variables are combined into factors." TABACHNICK & FIDELL, supra note 
1 17, at 597. The factor analysis was conducted on fourteen questions (each measured on a 
five-point Likert scale); varimax rotation was utilized to enhance the interpretability of the 
factors. The analysis demonstrated that the items comprised three orthogonal factors 
(labeled Assessment of Apology, Evaluation of Offer, and Attribution of Responsibility) 
accounting for a total of sixty-one percent of the variance. Scales based on the first two 
factors (Assessment of Apology and Evaluation of Offer) are described more fully infra 
notes 133-134, and were used in subsequent analyses. Because a scale constructed with 
variables based on the third factor (ratings of the offender's responsibility, and the 
participant's own responsibility) (alpha = .59) was not influenced by whether an apology was 
offered (F(2,59) = .052, p = .950), nor was it related to settlement decisions (x2(2) = .870, p = 
.647), this factor was not included in subsequent analyses. 
133. The first scale, labeled "Assessment of Apology," included participants' ratings of 
the sufficiency of the apology, the degree to which the offender thought he or she was 
responsible ,  the offender's regret, the degree to which the offender would be careful in the 
future, sympathy for the offender, and the offender's morality (alpha = .87). 
134. The second scale, labeled "Evaluation of Offer," appeared to comprise an 
evaluation of the offer relative to the offense and included participants' ratings of the degree 
to which the offer would "make up for" their injuries (reverse coded), their willingness to 
forgive the offender (reverse coded), the severity of their injuries, the damage done to the 
relationship, their anger, and the conduct of the offender (alpha = .81). 
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the results reported above for the individual underlying questions, 135 
the nature of the apology received influenced scores on both scales. 
Specifically, participants who received a full apology made more 
positive assessments of the apology and the information conveyed by 
the apology than did participants who were told they had received 
only a partial apology or no apology.136 Moreover, participants who 
had received a full apology made more positive evaluations of the 
offer than did participants who were told that they had received only a 
partial apology or no apology.137 
In addition, each of these scales influenced settlement 
decisionmaking. Participants who made more favorable assessments of 
the apology and the information that it communicated were more 
likely to agree to settle the case than they were to be unsure or to 
reject the offer.138 Similarly, participants who made more favorable 
evaluations of the offer were more likely to agree to settle the case 
than they were to be unsure or to reject the offer.139 














Note: Statistically significant effects are indicated by solid lines; marginally significant 
effects are indicated by dashed lines. 
Figure 1 depicts the relationships among the nature of the apology, 
participants' attributions and perceptions, and settlement decisions.140 
135. See supra notes 122-131 and accompanying text. 
136. No Apology mean = 2.56; Partial Apology mean = 2.59; Full Apology mean = 3.90. 
F(2,60) = 19.531, p < .001. 
137. No Apology mean = 2.60; Partial Apology mean = 2.46; Full Apology mean = 3.37. 
F(2,60) = 9.050, p < .001. 
138. i(2) = 8. 747, p = .013. More favorable assessments increased the likelihood that 
the respondent would accept the offer rather than reject it (p = .016) or be unsure (p = .034). 
139. j(2) = 20.150, p < .001. More favorable evaluations increased the likelihood that 
the respondent would accept the offer rather than reject it (p = .001) or be unsure (p = .004). 
140. Recall that in order to show that an apology operates to influence settlement 
decisionmaking through the ways in which it influences the injured party's perceptions and 
attributions about the situation, it must be shown not only that the apology affects both 
settlement decisions and individual perceptions and attributions, and that the perceptions 
and attributions directly influence settlement decisionmaking, but also that the effect of the 
apology on decisionmaking is lessened when perceptions and attributions are controlled. See 
supra note 116. Given the content of the two scales, it was hypothesized that these two sets 
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First, as noted above, the nature of the apology was found to influence 
assessments of the apology and of the information an apology is 
thought to convey.141 Second, there was a significant relationship 
between the nature of the apology and participants' evaluations of the 
offer that was mediated by the participants' assessments of the 
apology.142 Third, participants' assessments of the apology and their 
evaluations of the offer together partially mediated the relationship 
between the nature of the apology and participants' settlement 
decisions; apology, however, retained a marginally significant direct 
effect on settlement decisions.143 
2. Effects of Evidentiary Rules on Settlement 
The second set of analyses explored the effects of the different 
evidentiary rules on settlement decisionmaking.144 Differences in 
evidentiary rules did not produce significant differences in settlement 
rates145 nor did they produce differences in participants' perceptions 
and attributions.146 Importantly, there were no effects of the 
of perceptions would work in tandem to mediate the effect of an apology on settlement 
decisionmaking. Thus, it was expected that the nature of the apology would influence 
assessments of the apology and perceptions of the information conveyed by the apology. It 
was expected that these assessments, in turn, would influence evaluations of the offer, and 
that this evaluation would influence decisionmaking. A series of additional regression 
analyses were conducted to test these propositions. See infra notes 141-143 and 
accompanying text. 
141. See supra notes 136-137 and accompanying text. 
142. As demonstrated above, the nature of the apology was correlated with both 
assessments of the apology and evaluations of the offer. See supra notes 136-137 and 
accompanying text. In addition, assessments of the apology and evaluations of the offer were 
significantly related (F(l,61) = 28. 789, p < .001). Moreover, when evaluations of the offer 
were regressed on both the nature of the apology and assessments of the apology (F(3,59) = 
10.600, p < .001), only assessments of the apology had a statistically significant influence on 
these evaluations (t = -3.280, p = .002). In this model, the nature of the apology did not 
significantly influence evaluations of the offer (t = -1.055, p = .296 and t = -1.639, p = .107). 
143. The nature of the apology, participants' assessments of the apology, and 
participants' evaluation of the offer were examined as predictors of participants' settlement 
decisions. Analyses revealed that when settlement decisions were regressed on a set of 
predictors that included the nature of the apology and both perception scales (x'(8) = 28.967, 
p < .001), participants' evaluation of the offer was the only statistically significant predictor 
of settlement decisions (x'(2) = 10.953, p = .004), the effect of the apology on settlement 
decisionmaking became marginally statistically significant (x'(4) = 8.465, p = .076), and the 
effect of assessments of the apology was not statistically significant (x' (2) = .547, p = . 761).  In 
other words, these mediators partially explain the effect of apology on settlement decisions. 
144. These analyses were conducted on the 2 (partial or full apology) x 3 (evidentiary 
rules) factorial. 
145. j(6) = 3.404, p = . 757. Neither the evidentiary rule (x'(4) = 1.551, p = .818) nor the 
apology (x'(2) = 1.898, p = .387) had a statistically significant influence on settlement rates. 
A model that included interaction effects was also not statistically significant (x'(JO) = 8.786, 
p = .553). 
146. A 3 (evidentiary rule) x 2 (partial v. full apology) MANOVA conducted on 
participants' assessments of the case and the other party revealed no significant differences 
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evidentiary rules on ratings of the sufficiency147 or sincerity148 of the 
apology given. Participants were, however, aware of the differences in 
the rules as they assessed the scenario; analysis of participants' ratings 
of the likely motives for the apology revealed that apologies that were 
not protected by an evidentiary rule were seen as less likely to have 
been motivated by desire to avoid a lawsuit.149 Thus, participants were 
aware of the content of the different evidentiary rules, but did not 
adjust their assessments of the apologies received in response to those 
rules. 
3. Summary 
Therefore, apologies influenced the inclination to accept or reject a 
settlement offer. The effect of an apology on settlement decisions was 
complex, however, and depended on the type of apology offered. Only 
the full, responsibility-accepting apology increased the likelihood that 
the offer would be accepted. The partial, sympathy-expressing, 
apology, in contrast, increased participants' uncertainty about whether 
or not to accept the offer. 
Moreover, apologies were found to influence ratings of numerous 
variables that are thought to underlie the settlement decision. The 
effects of apologies on these underlying constructs, however, were 
limited to the full apology in which the offender accepted 
responsibility. Offering a partial apology was no different from 
offering no apology at all. These underlying judgments are likely to 
favorably change the dynamics of the negotiation and also provided 
the mechanism by which apologies influenced settlement decisions. 
Importantly for the debate over evidentiary protection for 
apologies, while participants were aware of the different evidentiary 
rules governing the admissibility of the apology, the nature of the 
applicable rule did not influence the apologies' effect on settlement 
decisions, nor did these rules influence participants' perceptions of the 
situation or the offender. 
among the evidentiary rules (F(28, 184) = 1.057, p = .395) and no significant interaction 
(F(28, 184) = 0.906, p = .605). This analysis did reveal a statistically significant multivariate 
effect of the apology (F(/4,92) = 6. 778, p < .001). Since the follow-up analyses revealed 
differences between the partial and full apologies that were similar to those demonstrated by 
the planned comparisons of these conditions with no apology control, see supra notes 122-
131 and accompanying text, details will not be presented here. 
147. F(2,118) = .646, p = .526. 
148. F(2,l 16) = .870, p = .422. 
149. F(2,116) = 5.987, p = .003. This test was a follow-up to a 3 (evidentiary rule) x 2 
(partial v. full apology) MANOV A conducted on participants' judgments about the 
offender's motives for apologizing, which revealed statistically significant effects of both the 
type of apology (F(5,llO) = 4.130, p = .002) and the type of evidentiary rule (F(I0,220) = 
2.039, p = .031). No significant interaction was detected (F(I0,220) = 0.899, p = .534). 
492 Michigan Law Review 
B. Factors Influencing the Effects of Apologies 
1 .  Responsibility and Injury 
(Vol. 102:460 
A second study was conducted to explore the boundaries of these 
findings. This study, again, examined recipients' interpretations of 
apologies and the effect of those apologies on willingness to accept a 
settlement offer in the dispute.1s0 This time, however, in addition to 
the nature of the apology and the type of evidentiary rule, the strength 
of the evidence of the offender's fault and the severity of the resulting 
injury were manipulated. 1s1 
a. Evidence of Responsibility. Participants in the first study saw the 
alleged offender as clearly responsible for the accident.1s2 The impact 
of an apology on decisionmaking, however, may vary depending on 
the strength of the evidence of the defendant's responsibility for the 
plaintiff's injuries. First, the evidentiary value of the apology is likely 
to differ in relation to other evidence of responsibility. Thus, strong 
evidence of the defendant's responsibility absent any apology reduces 
the additional evidentiary value of the apology itself; " [w]here one's 
culpability can readily be proved by independent evidence other than 
an apology, admitting one's fault when making an apology will also 
have little impact on the plaintiff's ability to prove his case, for he 
already can."1s3 Conversely, where responsibility is unclear, the risk 
that apologizing will result in an adverse liability judgment may be 
greater. 
Second, independent evidence for the defendant's responsibility 
may influence the ways in which any apology is interpreted. Cohen 
posits that where there is clear responsibility for an incident, an 
expression of sympathy alone "can be worse than saying nothing at all. 
It's insulting to merely express sympathy or benevolence when you 
should be admitting your fault."1s4 If this is true, a partial apology may 
be viewed as an inappropriate response from a clearly responsible 
defendant. On the other hand, a partial apology might be viewed as 
entirely appropriate when the proper allocation of responsibility is 
150. The nature of the apology and the nature of the applicable evidentiary rule were 
varied as they were in the first study. 
151.  These additional variables were expected to moderate the effects of the apology 
and the evidentiary rules on settlement decisionmaking. "(A] moderator is a qualitative (e.g., 
sex, race, class) or quantitative (e.g., level of reward) variable that affects the direction 
and/or strength of the relation between an independent or predictor variable and a 
dependent or criterion variable." Baron & Kenny, supra note 1 16, at 1 174. 
152. On a scale of one to five, with higher numbers representing clear responsibility, 
participants rated the alleged offender as highly responsible in all apology conditions (No 
Apology mean = 4.48; Partial Apology mean = 4.56; Full Apology mean = 4.50). 
153. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, supra note 3, at 1028-29. 
154. Cohen, Legislating Apology, supra note 43, at 838. 
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unclear, because the defendant may not be expected to acknowledge 
responsibility under such circumstances.155 
To test these propositions, the available evidence regarding the 
offender's responsibility for the incident was varied - a second set of 
conditions, in which the fault evidence was less clear, was 
introduced.156 It was hypothesized that more ambiguous fault might 
make the admissibility of the apology more important and, thus, that 
the evidentiary rules would be more likely to have an impact on 
settlement decisions or the underlying attributions. Moreover, it was 
expected that a partial apology would be more effective when fault 
was less clear. 
b. Extent of Injury. In similar ways, many have speculated that the 
effectiveness of a partial apology may vary with the degree to which 
the victim is injured. While those suffering more severe harm may 
desire and require "more intense" apologies to mitigate their harm,157 
those suffering less severe consequences may be satisfied with a less 
complex apology. 
In some instances, a statement of remorse may be all the victim needs to 
get past the incident. This is particularly likely where the victim's injury 
is slight . . . .  In such cases, the restoration of the relationship between the 
parties may be more important than the payment of any damage 
award.158 
Indeed, Schlenker and Darby found that apologizers tended to make 
more complex apologies (including more components) as the severity 
of the consequences increased.159 
Several studies suggest that the degree of harm suffered by the 
victim influences the degree to which an apology is accepted or 
effective. Ken-ichi Ohbuchi and his colleagues found that participants 
formed a better impression of and expected less verbal aggression to 
be directed toward a wrongdoer who apologized than one who did 
not. They found, however, that these beneficial effects of apologizing 
155. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, supra note 3, at 1048 ("Expressing one's 
sympathy without expressing fault or remorse can be a very useful step in those many cases 
where the extent of each party's fault is unclear."); see also Latif, supra note 37. 
156. The scenario was modified so that in the condition in which responsibility was less 
clear, one witness said that she thought the rider was going a little bit too fast, there was no 
previous close call, and the injured pedestrian was described as not paying attention. This 
manipulation was successful: participants rated the offender as more responsible in the 
condition in which the offender's responsibility was more clear (mean = 4.44) than they did 
in the condition where responsibility was more ambiguous (mean = 3.96) . F(l,355) = 33.518, 
p < .001. In addition, participants rated their own responsibility as greater in the ambiguous 
condition (mean = 2.04) than in the clear-evidence condition (mean = 1.49). F(l,355) = 
47.224, p < .001. 
157. See Ohbuchi et al., supra note 19. 
158. Latif, supra note 37, at 315; see also Levi, supra note 3. 
159. Barry R. Schlenker & Bruce W. Darby, The Use of Apologies in Social 
Predicaments, 44 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 271 (1981). 
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were lessened when the harm was more severe, although they did not 
disappear entirely.1(j() Similarly, in a vignette study, Mark Bennett and 
Deborah Earwaker found that participants were more likely to reject 
an apology that was offered following severe property damage than 
they were to reject the same apology following less severe damage.161 
In addition, the apology was more successful in reducing participants' 
anger when the injury was minor than it was when the injury was more 
severe.162 
Accordingly, the severity of the resulting injury was varied - a 
second set of injury conditions, involving more minor injuries, was 
included.163 It was expected that partial apologies would be more likely 
to be effective if the injury were relatively minor. In all, there were 
seven different variations of the basic scenario.164 Three hundred sixty­
one people participated in the study and were randomly assigned to 
one of the sixteen experimental conditions.165 
2. Effects of the Nature of the Apology 
The first set of analyses explored the effects of the severity of the 
injury and evidence of the offender's responsibility on the influence of 
apologies on both settlement decisionmaking and participants' 
perceptions and attributions.166 Although no significant effect of 
apology on ultimate settlement decisions was detected, 167 analyses of 
the effects of the nature of the apology on attributions and perceptions 
revealed several interesting patterns. First, the results obtained were 
similar to those in the first study; as a general matter, full apologies 
160. Ohbuchi et al., supra note 19. 
161. Bennett & Earwaker, supra note 70. 
162. Id. 
163. In the minor injury condition, the injuries were modified to consist solely of a slight 
concussion and several scratches and bruises. This manipulation was successful: participants 
rated the severity of the injury as more severe in the more severe condition (mean = 3.84) 
than in the less severe condition (mean = 2. 74). F(l,358) = 205.285, p < .001. 
164. The study utilized a 3 (apology) x 2 (injury severity) x 2 (evidence of responsibility) 
factorial design with three types of evidentiary rules nested within the full apology 
conditions. 
165. Participants ranged in age from twenty-one to sixty-nine (mean = 38); thirty-nine 
percent of participants were male. 
166. This portion of the analysis was done on the 3 (apology) x 2 (injury severity) x 2 
(evidence of responsibility) part of the design. 
167. The overall significant effect of the model (x2(8) = 34.932, p < .001) was due to the 
statistically significant effect of the severity of the injury on settlement rates (x'(2) = 27.953, 
p < .001): when the injuries were less severe, the likelihood of settling increased versus either 
not settling or remaining unsure (ps < .05). There were no statistically significant effeets of 
apology (x'(4) = 4.655, p = .325) or evidence of responsibility (x'(2) = 3.037, p = .219). 
Similarly, the only statistically significant effects in a model that included the two-way 
interactions (x'(l8) = 46.467, p < .001) were the effects of the severity of the injury. 
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improved the participants' perceptions of the situation and the 
offender, while partial apologies did little to alter such perceptions. 
Second, there were some indications that partial apologies could 
negatively impact perceptions where responsibility is relatively clear 
or where the injury is more severe. Finally there were some 
indications that partial apologies could positively impact perceptions 
where responsibility is relatively less clear or where the injury is 
relatively minor. 
a. Beneficial Effects of Full Apologies. Consistent with the results 
of the first study, there was evidence suggesting that, overall, a full 
apology is better than a partial apology and that a partial apology is 
(often) not different than no apology. Where there were differences in 
participants' responses across conditions, the differences tended to 
follow the same pattern that was found in the first study: offering no 
apology or a partial apology elicited equivalent responses that were 
both different from the responses elicited when a full apology was 
offered. 168 The average ratings for variables on which apology had 
significant main effects are displayed in Table 2. 
TABLE 2 
PARTICIPANTS' PERCEPTIONS AND ATIRIBUTIONS (STUDY 2) 
No Partial Full 
Apology Apology Apology 
Sufficient apology* 1.80" 2.66b 4.lOC 
Regret 2.76" 2.91" 4.12b 
Moral character 2.65" 3 .06b 3.86c 
Careful in future* 3.82" 3 .68" 4.25b 
Belief that Responsible 2.55" 2.69" 4.82b 
Bad Conduct* 3.49" 3.16" 2.77b 
Sympathy* 2.20•b 1 .91" 2.56b 
Forgiveness 4.05" 4.05" 4.32b 
Damage to Relationship 2.84" 2.58" 2. 16b 
Note: All constructs were measured on 5 point scales; higher numbers represent "more" of 
168. A MANOV A conducted on participants' assessments of the case and the other 
party revealed significant multivariate effects of apology (F(l5,129) = 16.046, p < .001), 
injury severity (F(l5,129) = 8.612, p < .001), and evidence of responsibility (F(l5,129) = 
4.912, p < .001). Follow-up 3 x 2 x 2 ANOVA were conducted for each variable separately; it 
is these univariate effects that are presented in Table 3. Except where otherwise noted, all 
post-hoc ps < .05. 
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the construct. For each rating, means with different superscripts differ significantly (p < .05). 
*These effects are qualified by statistically significant interactions. See infra. 
Thus, a full apology was viewed as more sufficient than either a 
partial apology or no apology.169 An offender who offered a full 
apology was seen as experiencing more regret,170 as being more 
moral,171 and as more likely to be careful in the future172 than one 
offering a partial or no apology. While an offender offering a full 
apology was seen as believing that he or she was more responsible for 
the incident than one who offered a partial or no apology,173 the 
conduct of the full apologizer was judged more favorably than that of 
offenders who offered either a partial or no apology.174 Participants 
expressed greater sympathy toward the offender who offered a full 
apology than they did toward the offender who offered a partial 
apology.175 Participants indicated more willingness to forgive an 
offender who gave a full apology than they did an offender offering a 
partial or no apology176 and expected that less damage to the parties' 
relationship would result following a full apology than they did 
following a partial or no apology.177 
Consistent with the results for the individual underlying questions, 
the nature of the apology received influenced scores on scales 
representing participants' assessments of the apology and evaluations 
of the offer.178 Overall, participants who received a full apology made 
169. F(2,255) = 107.466, p < .001. Here, a full apology was perceived as being more 
sufficient than was a partial apology which was, in turn, perceived as being more sufficient 
than no apology. This main effect, however, was qualified by statistically significant 
interactions between apology and evidence of responsibility and between apology and the 
severity of the injury. See infra notes 187-188 and accompanying text. 
170. F(2,256) = 36.511, p < .001. 
171. F(2,247) = 35.602, p < .001. Here, an offender who offered a full apology was 
perceived as being more moral than an offender who offered a partial apology who was, in 
turn, perceived as being more moral than an offender who failed to offer an apology. 
172 F(2,253) = 8.814, p < .001. This main effect was qualified by a statistically significant 
interaction between apology and evidence of responsibility. See infra note 185 and 
accompanying text. 
173. F(2,256) = 110.688, p < .001. 
174. F(2,255) = 11.129, p < .001. This main effect was qualified by a statistically 
significant interaction between apology and evidence of responsibility. See infra note 189 
and accompanying text. 
175. F(2,252) = 8.539, p < .001. No difference between full and none (or between none 
and partial). This main effect was qualified by a statistically significant interaction between 
apology and evidence of responsibility. See infra note 186 and accompanying text. 
176. F(2,254) = 4.301, p  = .015. 
177. F(2,251) = 9.155, p < .001. 
178. Factor analysis was conducted for the entire sample on the same fourteen questions 
that were used in the first study (each measured on a five-point Likert scale); varimax 
rotation was utilized to enhance the interpretability of the factors. The analysis 
demonstrated that the items comprised the same three orthogonal factors as in the first 
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more positive assessments of the apology and the information 
conveyed by the apology than did participants who were told they had 
received only a partial apology or no apology.179 In addition, 
participants who received a full apology made more positive 
evaluations of the offer than did participants who were told that they 
had received only a partial apology or no apology.180 
b. Detrimental Effects of Partial Apologies. This time, however, 
there were several sets of results that suggest that a partial apology 
can be detrimental. Overall, one who offered a partial apology was 
judged to be more responsible than one offering no apology.181 
Similarly, participants who were offered a partial apology judged their 
resulting injury as being more severe than did those who were offered 
no apology.182 
Notably, there is some evidence that a partial apology can be 
particularly detrimental when the resulting injury is severe or when 
there is strong evidence of the offender's responsibility. When the 
offender failed to take responsibility in the apology (i.e., offered a 
partial apology) for an incident that resulted in a severe injury the 
study, accounting for fifty-nine percent of the variance. Scales were created for each of these 
factors, Assessment of Apology (alpha = .84), Evaluation of Offer (alpha = . 77), and 
Attribution of Responsibility (alpha = .62). 
179. F(2,257) = 86.406, p < .001. No Apology mean = 2.63; Partial Apology mean = 2.81; 
Full Apology mean = 3.96. This effect was qualified by a significant interaction between the 
type of apology and the evidence of responsibility. See infra note 187 and accompanying text. 
180. F(2,258) = 5.816, p = .003. No Apology mean = 3.19; Partial Apology mean = 3.23; 
Full Apology mean = 3.48. Offers were also evaluated more positively when the evidence 
was less clear (F(l,258) = 12.725, p < .001) and when the injury was less severe (F(l,258) = 
80.047, p < .001). 
Because there was not a significant relationship between the type of apology offered and 
settlement rates, see supra note 167, mediational analysis was not appropriate. Relationships 
among the variables, however, suggest a pattern similar to that found in the first study. 
Specifically, as already noted, the type of apology was related to assessments of the apology 
and to evaluations of the offer. See supra note 179. In addition, assessments of the apology 
were correlated with evaluations of the offer (F(l,267) = 73.417, p < .001) and evaluations of 
the offer were related to settlement rates (X2(2) = 28.433, p < .001). 
181. F(2,255) = 5.169, p = .006. This main effect was qualified by a statistically significant 
interaction between apology and injury severity. See infra note 183 and accompanying text. 
182 F(2,258) = 4.363, p = .014. 
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degree of responsibility attributed to the offender was greater183 and 
the offer was seen as less likely to make up for the injury.184 
Moreover, an offender who failed to take responsibility in the 
apology (i.e., offered a partial apology) in the face of strong evidence 
of responsibility was seen as less likely to be careful in the future than 
those offering either a full or no apology.185 This suggests that if 
relatively clear fault is explicitly not accepted, the careless behavior is 
seen as more stable, that is, as more likely to persist. In addition, 
where there was strong evidence of responsibility, participants 
reported less sympathy for the offender who offered a partial apology 
than for offenders who offered a full apology or no apology.186 
c. Beneficial Effects of Partial Apologies. At the same time, 
however, there is some evidence that partial apologies can be more 
beneficial if the offender is less clearly at fault or where the resulting 
injury is less severe. Where there was strong evidence of offender 
responsibility, a partial apology was perceived as being no more 
sufficient than no apology. Where the evidence of the offender's 
responsibility was more ambiguous, however, a partial apology was 
perceived as more sufficient than no apology.187 This suggests that 
where it is unclear that the offender was at fault, the offender is not 
(or is less) expected to accept responsibility. Similarly, where the 
injury was more severe, a partial apology was perceived as being no 
more sufficient than no apology. Where the injury was minor, 
183. F(2,255) = 3.182, p = .043. In contrast, when the injury was minor, there were no 
differences in responsibility attributions among the apology conditions. Similarly, there was 
also a marginally significant effect of the type of apology on the third scale, Attribution of 
Responsibility, see supra note 178; when a partial apology was offered, respondents 
attributed more of the responsibility to the offender than when either a full apology or no 
apology was offered. F(2,258) = 2.854, p = .059. This marginal effect was qualified by a 
significant interaction between the type of apology offered and the degree of injury. F(2,258) 
= 4.539, p = .012. Where the injury was relatively minor, the type of apology had no effect on 
attributions of responsibility; where the injury was more severe, however, participants 
attributed more responsibility to the offender who offered a partial apology than to either 
the offender who offered no apology or who offered a full apology. 
184. F(2,258) = 6.059, p = .003. In contrast, where the injury was minor, there were no 
significant differences among the apology conditions. 
185. F(2,253) = 5. 174, p = .006. In contrast, where the evidence of responsibility was 
more ambiguous, participants viewed the offender who offered a full apology as more likely 
to be careful than the offender who offered no apology. 
186. F(2,252) = 3.217, p = .042. In contrast, where the evidence of responsibility was 
more ambiguous, participants reported more sympathy for the offender who offered a full 
apology than for offenders who offered partial or no apologies. 
187. F(2,225) = 4.990, p = .013. In both cases, a full apology was still seen as more 
sufficient than either a partial or no apology. A statistically significant interaction for scores 
on the Assessment of Apology scale, F(2,257) = 3. 717, p = .026, is consistent with these 
results. Where the evidence of the offender's responsibility was relatively clear, a full 
apology was assessed more positively than either a partial or no apology. Where the 
evidence was less clear, however, a partial apology was assessed more positively than no 
apology, though less positively than a full apology. 
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however, a partial apology was seen as more sufficient than no 
apology.188 
In addition, where there was strong evidence of offender 
responsibility, the offender's conduct was rated more favorably only if 
the offender provided a full apology and not if the offender provided a 
partial apology. Where the evidence was relatively ambiguous, 
however, the offender's conduct was rated more favorably following 
either a full or a partial apology.189 
3. Effects of Evidentiary Rule 
The second set of analyses explored the effects of the different 
evidentiary rules and the evidence of the offender's responsibility for 
the incident when a full apology was offered.190 Consistent with the 
results of the first study, differences among the evidentiary rules did 
not produce significant differences in settlement rates, 191 nor did they 
produce differences in participants' perceptions and attributions. 192 
188. F(2,255) = 3.919, p = .032. In both cases, a full apology was still perceived as more 
sufficient than either a partial or no apology. 
189. F(2,225) = 10.715, p < .001. There was a similar interaction between the apology 
and injury severity that was marginally significant. F(2,255) = 2.333, p = .099. When the 
resulting injury was more severe, the offender's conduct was rated more favorably if the 
offender provided a full apology than if the offender provided a partial or no apology. 
Where the injury was minor, however, the offender's conduct was rated more favorably 
following either a full or a partial apology. 
In addition to the effects on the manipulation checks described above, supra notes 156 
and 163, and the interactions with apology just described, there were several other main 
effects of the severity of the injury and the evidence of responsibility. When the injury was 
relatively minor, participants were less angry (F(l,253) = 26.310, p < .001), felt less 
responsible (F(l,256) = 4. 713, p = .031), were more willing to forgive the offender (F(l,254) 
= 10. 768, p = .001), expected less damage to the relationship (F(l,258) = 30.624, p < .001), 
and judged the offender to be of higher moral character (F(l,247) = 5.040, p = .026) than 
when the injuries were more severe. In addition, when the injury was relatively minor 
participants were more likely to accept the offer than to reject it (p < .001) or to be unsure (p 
= .005) than when the injury was more severe. See supra note 167. Similarly, where evidence 
of the offender's responsibility was less clear, participants were Jess angry (F(l,253) = 6.520, 
p = .OJ 1), judged the offender as experiencing more regret (F(J,256) = 5.272, p = .022) and as 
being of higher moral character (F(l,247) = 9.499, p = .002), rated the offender's conduct 
more favorably (F(J,255) = 22.493, p < .001), and were more willing to forgive the offender 
(F(J,254) = 3.817, p = .052) than when the evidence was more clear. 
190. These analyses were conducted on the 2 (evidence of responsibility) x 3 
(evidentiary rule) portion of the design. 
191. j(6) = J.320, p = .971. There were no statistically significant effects of evidentiary 
rule (x.'(4) = .567, p = .967) or evidence of responsibility (X.2(2) = .805, p = .669). The 
evidentiary rules did not produce differences in settlement rates either where the evidence 
of the offender's responsibility was relatively clear or where the offender's responsibility was 
Jess clear. A model that included the interaction effect was also not statistically significant. 
x.'(10) = 3.434, p = .969. 
192. A 3 (evidentiary rule) x 2 (evidence of responsibility) MANOVA conducted on 
participants' assessments of the case and the other party revealed no significant differences 
among the evidentiary rules (F(30,208) = . 751, p = .823) and no significant interaction 
(F(30,208) = 1.044, p = .41 !). This analysis also revealed no statistically significant 
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Again, however, participants did notice the differences in the rules as 
they assessed the scenario; analysis of participants' ratings of the likely 
motives for the apology revealed that apologies that were not 
protected by an evidentiary rule were seen as less likely to have been 
motivated by desire to avoid a lawsuit.193 Thus, participants were 
aware of the content of the different evidentiary rules, but, again, did 
not adjust their assessments of the apologies received in response to 
those rules. 
4. Summary 
Consistent with the results of the first study, apologies influenced 
participants' attributions and perceptions of the situation and the 
offender. Overall, full apologies improved the participants' 
perceptions of the situation and the offender, while partial apologies 
did little to alter such perceptions. Exploration of the possible 
moderating influences of the severity of the injury and the evidence of 
the offender's responsibility revealed some interesting boundary 
conditions on these overall results. In particular, there were patterns 
in the data suggesting both that partial apologies may negatively 
impact perceptions where responsibility is relatively clear or where the 
injury is more severe and that partial apologies may positively impact 
perceptions where responsibility is relatively less clear or where the 
injury is relatively minor. 
multivariate effect of evidence of responsibility (F(15,104) = 1.354, p = .185). Importantly, 
there were no effects of the different evidentiary rules on ratings of the sufficiency (F(2,128) 
= 1.118, p = .330) or sincerity (F(2,124) = .696, p = .500) of the apology given. In addition, the 
full apology positively influenced perceptions, regardless of which evidentiary rule was 
described. Across the different evidentiary rules, when compared to the conditions in which 
no apology was offered, a full apology was generally seen as more sufficient, and as 
evidencing the offender's greater regret, greater belief that he or she was responsible, and 
higher moral character, regardless of which evidentiary rule was described. A 4 (no apology, 
full apology with no evidentiary rule specified, full apology - protected, full apology -
unprotected) x 2 (evidence of responsibility) MANOVA was conducted on participants' 
perceptions. This analysis revealed a statistically significant effect of the apology condition 
(F(45,446) = 5.350, p < .001) as well as a marginally significant effect of evidence of 
responsibility (F(l5, 150) = 1.697, p = .057). Univariate analyses of the apology conditions 
revealed that this effect was largely driven by differences between the no apology condition 
and each of the full apology conditions. 
193. F(2,126) = 7.291, p = .001. This test was a follow-up to a 3 (evidentiary rule) x 2 
(evidence of responsibility) MANOVA conducted on participants' judgments about the 
offender's motives for apologizing, which revealed a statistically significant effect of the type 
of evidentiary rule (F(J0,242) = 2.561, p = .006). No significant effect of the evidence of 
responsibility (F(5,121) = .466, p = .801) and only a marginal interaction (F(J0,242) = 1. 704, 
p = .081) were detected. These results are consistent with those of the first study. See supra 
note 149. Follow-ups also revealed that the apology that was not protected by an evidentiary 
rule was thought to be more likely motivated by a desire to diminish suffering than was an 
apology that was not so protected (F(2,126) = 3.879, p = .023) (and marginally more than a 
protected apology (p < .JO)). 
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In addition, consistent with the results of the first study, this study 
provided no evidence that the nature of the applicable evidentiary rule 
will influence participants' perceptions of the situation, the offender, 
or the apology. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF RESULTS 
Legal actors in the United States have traditionally assumed that 
apologies would be viewed by judges and juries as admissions of 
responsibility that will lead to increased legal liability. This perception 
is thought to be largely responsible for a perceived reluctance on the 
part of potential defendants in civil lawsuits to apologize to those that 
they have, or may have, injured.1 94 
Recently, scholars have debated the utility of safe apologies in civil 
litigation. Despite concern that apologies will increase the risk of 
liability, many are now promoting apologies as beneficial in settling 
lawsuits. There is increasing interest in the possibility that an apology 
can serve to resolve a dispute so as to avoid or bring an end to 
litigation or, where it cannot do so directly, the possibility that an 
apology may set the stage for the parties to engage in more productive 
settlement discussions. In particular, safe apologies have been 
promoted in an attempt to balance aspirations for the beneficial 
effects of apologies on settlement with the potentially increased risk of 
adverse liability findings.195 Legal reform efforts have begun to follow 
this path - moving to provide legal protection for apologies.196 At the 
same time, however, other commentators have criticized safe 
apologies as diminished in meaning, moral value, and effectiveness.197 
The data reported here comprise an initial empirical examination 
of the effects of apologies on settlement decisionmaking. Importantly, 
these studies provide evidence that offering an apology can facilitate 
conflict resolution. These studies also make clear, however, that the 
effects of apologies on settlement decisionmaking are influenced by a 
variety of factors. These complex effects present policymakers and 
litigants or potential litigants with some difficult decisions about the 
appropriate evidentiary protection for apologies, whether to offer an 
apology to an opposing party in civil litigation, and how to respond to 
an apology so offered. 
194. See supra Part I.A. 
195. See supra Parts 1.B-C. 
196. See supra Part LC. 
197. See supra Part I.D. 
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One mechanism by which several states have attempted to make 
apologies safe is to provide them with statutory protection that 
prevents the admissibility of some apologies as evidence of liability. 
The results of the present study inform decisions to be made by 
policymakers considering safe-harbor statutes to protect apologetic 
expressions. The data reported here provide no support for the 
intuition that evidentiary protection for apologies will affect the ways 
in which apologies are perceived. Instead, these results are consistent 
with the contrary intuition that even statutorily protected apologies 
have a role to play in defusing conflict. Across two studies, the 
different evidentiary rules did not produce significant differences in 
settlement rates or in participants' perceptions of the negotiation 
situation or the other party.198 
What might explain the apparent lack of effects of safe-harbor 
statutes on assessments of apologies and on settlement behavior? 
One psychologically based account for these results relies on a 
psychological heuristic known as the fundamental attribution error,199 
or correspondence bias.200 As a general matter, observers have a 
tendency to attribute people's attitudes and behavior to dispositional 
factors rather than situational factors.201 Thus, in understanding the 
behavior of another person, we tend to explain their behavior with 
reference to their character more than to their circumstances. 
This phenomenon has been demonstrated empirically in a wide 
variety of situations, including negotiation.202 For example, Michael 
198. This was true even though it was made clear that both parties were aware of the 
rules. In the real world, where parties to a dispute like this one are less likely to know about 
the rules of evidence as they apply to apologies, this might be even more so. 
199. RICHARD E. NISBETI & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND 
SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980); LEE Ross & RICHARD E. NISBETI, THE 
PERSON AND THE SITUATION 4 (1991); Lee Ross, The Intuitive Psychologist and His 
Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution Process, 10 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL Soc. 
PSYCHOL. 173 (1977) ("People's inflated belief in the importance of personality traits and 
dispositions, together with their failure to recognize the importance of situational factors in 
affecting behavior, has been termed the 'fundamental attribution error.' "). 
200. EDWARD E. JONES, INTERPERSONAL PERCEPTION 138-66 (1990). 
201. See NISBETI & Ross, supra note 199; Ross & NISBETI, supra note 199; Ross, supra 
note 199; see also John M. Darley & C. Daniel Batson, From Jerusalem to Jericho: A Study 
of Situational and Dispositional Variables in Helping Behavior, 27 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. 
PSYCHOL. 100 (1973); Edward E. Jones & Victor A. Harris, The Attribution of Attitudes, 3 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 1 (1967); Paula R. Pietromonaco & Richard E. Nisbett, 
Swimming Upstream Against the Fundamental Attribution Error: Subjects' Weak 
Generalizations from the Darley and Batson Study, 10 Soc. BEHA v. & PERSONALITY 1 
(1982). 
202. Morris et al., supra note 103, at 53. Morris and his colleagues also describe 
unpublished data by Dorris et al. in which: 
[They] created a bidding game in which a buyer and a seller were each given a limit on the 
price on which they could settle and still make a profit. When sellers had a high limit, deals 
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Morris, Richard Larrick, and Steven Su asked pairs of participants to 
negotiate the salary in a job offer. Participants in the role of the job 
candidates were provided with information about their alternative to 
reaching an agreement with the employer - the alternative job offer 
differed among participants in its certainty and value. Candidates' 
negotiation behavior was primarily determined by the value of their 
alternative.203 While participants in the role of the employer were able 
to discern differences in the value of their counterpart's alternative,204 
they nonetheless appraised candidates with low-value alternatives as 
having more agreeable characters,205 appraised candidates with more 
risky alternatives as more emotionally unstable,206 and expressed 
preferences for the candidates' subsequent job assignments that were 
consistent with these appraisals.207 
Thus, even when people grasp the nature of the situation, they may 
discount the influence of those situational factors on the other's 
behavior. Consequently, when an injured party receives an apology 
from an offender, particularly a full apology, he or she may be likely to 
attribute that apology to the disposition of the offender (e.g., he or she 
is genuinely sorry, is not the kind of person who will do this again, 
etc.) rather than to aspects of the situation (e.g., the law makes this 
apology safe and, therefore, it is offered at little legal cost). 
A related possibility is that respondents explicitly discounted these 
implications in forming their understandings of the situation. 
Participants might have recognized that an offender's motivation to 
offer an apology may be independent of whether or not it is legally 
were less likely. Interestingly, although participants knew their counterparts were 
constrained by an externally imposed limit, they nonetheless attributed their counterparts' 
behavior to personal intent: sellers in the high-limit condition were perceived by 
counterparts to have a competitive intent. 
Id. ; see also Harold H. Kelley et al., A Comparative Experimental Study of Negotiation 
Behavior, 16 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 411 (1970); Dean G. Pruitt & Julie L. 
Drews, The Effect of Time Pressure, Time Elapsed, and the Opponent's Concession Rate on 
Behavior in Negotiation, 5 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 43 (1969). More generally, 
Morris et al. write: 
The attribution of negotiation behavior to personality traits rather than situational 
constraints (although familiar to those who have been privy to the thoughts of disputants in 
a contentious strike or divorce) has been the subject of relatively few experimental 
studies . . . .  Nonetheless, studies have found that an opponent's situational constraints are 
often misunderstood. 
Morris et al., supra note 103, at 53. 
203. Morris et al., supra note 103, at 60. 
204. Id. at 57, 60. In two different studies, participants in the employer role were able to 
estimate the candidates' alternatives as being higher in the high-value conditions than in the 
low-value conditions. Id. at 57, 60. 
205. Id. at 57, 60. 
206. Id. at 57. 
207. Id. at 62. 
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protected by the state. As Cohen notes, "when a law is passed saying 
that the apology is inadmissible in court, it is not the injurer who says, 
'I'm apologizing, but you can't use my apology against me.' Rather, it 
is the state that says, 'he's apologizing, and you cannot use his apology 
against him.' "208 
Finally, participants may have discounted the influence of the 
statutory protection given the specific facts of the situation with which 
they were faced. In particular, in the studies described here, the 
apology at issue was offered very soon after the accident (before a 
lawsuit was filed) in the context of an interpersonal dispute between 
neighbors, where the offender's responsibility was judged to be 
relatively clear,209 and the offer was fairly reasonable.210 On these facts, 
then, the evidentiary value of the apology may have been thought to 
be minimal and, accordingly, recipients may not have attributed the 
apology or the lack of an apology to the various legal rules. Thus, it is 
possible that respondents would be more skeptical of protected 
apologies offered in conjunction with less generous offers, apologies 
offered outside the interpersonal context (e.g., by a corporation), or 
apologies offered later in the process. Clearly, additional research is 
needed to explore these boundaries. 
There is, then, at present, no evidence to suggest that protected 
apologies will be less effective or less valued by claimants than 
unprotected apologies. Accordingly, providing evidentiary protection 
for apologies may serve to encourage the offering of apologies,211 or at 
least to signal that apologies are a desired response to an injury­
producing event,212 without diminishing the value and effectiveness of 
apologies so offered. 213 
208. Cohen, Legislating Apology, supra note 43, at 855. 
209. See supra note 152. Thus, even in the conditions in which the offender's 
responsibility was less clear, participants judged the offender to be highly responsible 
overall, though less responsible than in the conditions in which the offender's responsibility 
was more clear. 
210. The offer in the present studies was designed to cover out-of-pocket costs. 
211. Note that whether and the degree to which more apologies might be offered under 
evidentiary protection is a separate empirical question. The data presented here address 
only the responses of injured parties to apologies that are offered by offenders under various 
legal protections. The data do not address whether the types of statutory protections that 
have been enacted, or are being considered, will in fact encourage apologies. 
212. Safe-harbor statutes might serve this expressive purpose even if there were no 
instrumental consequences for the offering of apologies or for settlement. See generally, Cass 
R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996). 
213. While the fact that participants did not devalue apologies that were protected by 
statute bodes well for the ability of these statutes to promote the useful exchange of 
apologies, it does raise the concern that plaintiffs may have difficulty distinguishing between 
sincere and strategic apologies. See infra notes 231-234 and accompanying text. 
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To the extent that the goals of such provisions are to encourage 
apologies in order to facilitate settlement,214 however, the current 
statutes may be protecting the wrong apologetic expressions. The 
current and proposed statutes predominantly protect partial apologies 
and those portions of full apologies that constitute expressions of 
sympathy, not admissions of responsibility.215 The results presented 
here suggest that it is full, responsibility-accepting, apologies that have 
a positive impact on settlement decisionmaking, rather than the partial 
apologies that are typically protected by the statutes. Moreover, full 
apologies, because they are admissions, are more likely to raise 
defendants' concerns about adverse liability rulings and are more 
likely deterred by potential admissibility. At the same time, however, 
offering protection to full apologies may result in the exclusion of 
probative evidence and may limit a plaintiff's ability to bring a 
successful lawsuit.216 
Accordingly, these data suggest that policy discussion ought to 
focus on the appropriateness of statutory protection for full apologies. 
Such policy discussion must consider the present findings regarding 
the beneficial effects of full apologies on settlement decisionmaking in 
light of other relevant considerations such as how best to encourage 
apologies, concerns about undue limits on the ability to bring lawsuits, 
the probative value of full apologies, and so on.217 
B. Defendants 
In the absence of statutory protection, defendants or potential 
defendants who desire to apologize are faced with balancing the 
effects of apologies on different types of judgments - settlement 
decisionmaking, liability decisions, and decisions about appropriate 
damage awards - as well as weighing the less strategic aspects of 
apologizing. The results of the instant studies inform one important 
component of these interrelated decisions - the impact of apology on 
settlement decisions. An important lesson for defendants to draw from 
these data is that apologies can have beneficial effects on settlement, 
altering the injured parties' perceptions of the situation and the 
214. See, e.g. , CAL. ASSEMBLY COMM. ON JUDICIARY, COMMENT TO CAL. EVID. CODE 
§ 1 160 ("The author introduced this bill in an attempt to reduce lawsuits and encourage 
settlements by fostering the use of apologies in connection with accident-related injuries or 
death."). 
215. See supra Part J.C. 
216. See Cohen, Legislating Apology, supra note 43, at 856-63; see also supra note 53 
(describing objections to the Colorado statute). 
217. Evaluating the overall merits of evidentiary protection for full apologetic 
expressions is beyond the scope of this Article. See Cohen, Legislating Apology, supra note 
43, at 841-66 (describing the pros and cons of such protection); Orenstein, supra note 3 
(proposing evidentiary protection for full apologies). 
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offender so as to make them more amenable to settlement discussions 
and ultimately more likely to accept an offer. 
As a general matter, the results of the present study provide 
evidence that a full apology that both expresses sympathy for the 
victim's injuries and accepts responsibility for those injuries influences 
a variety of perceptions and attributions about the situation and the 
other party that might lead to a settlement or allow the parties to 
begin discussions.218 Full apologies were seen as more sufficient 
apologies, as evidencing more regret and a greater likelihood of care 
in the future, and as offered by people of higher moral character. Full 
apologies favorably altered assessments of the conduct leading to the 
injuries and changed the emotions of the injured party so as to reduce 
anger and increase sympathy for the offender. Full apologies were 
seen as mitigating potential damage to the relationship, were more 
likely to lead to forgiveness, and inclined injured parties to look more 
favorably on the settlement offer. In addition, the results of the first 
study demonstrated that full apologies, through these effects on 
perceptions and attributions, increased the likelihood that the 
settlement offer would be accepted.219 
Accordingly, full apologies that include accepting responsibility for 
the incident may facilitate the settling of lawsuits. These 
"responsibility-accepting" apologies, however, are precisely the type 
of apologies that most clearly raise concerns about the effects of 
apologizing on liability decisionmaking and are not likely to be 
protected by evidentiary rules protecting apologies. Making a 
statement that admits fault and that might be admissible at trial, while 
improving the prospects for settling the case, is thought to increase the 
risk that the offender will be found liable.220 
For this reason, there is growing interest in ways in which 
offenders can apologize without exposing themselves to the same risks 
attendant to a full, responsibility-accepting apology. The present 
research suggests that the effects of such partial apologies are complex 
and identifies several aspects of the case that defendants ought to take 
into account when considering a partial apology. First, the effects of 
partial apologies on settlement decisionmaking appear to be much 
more complicated than the effects of full apologies. On the whole, 
partial apologies did not appear to facilitate settlement in the ways 
218. See supra Part III.A. l. 
219. See supra Part III.A.l. 
220. It is not clear what risk an apology entails for liability determinations. See supra 
note 19. The present study did not address this issue directly, as the participants were not 
asked to take on the role of third-party decision makers and were not asked to make liability 
determinations. Participants, however, were asked to judge the responsibility of the alleged 
offender. In the first study, apologies had no effect on judged responsibility for the incident. 
In the second study, offenders offering a partial apology were judged to be more responsible 
than those who offered no apology. See supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
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hoped by proponents. The most consistent finding was that partial 
apologies tended to be no better (or worse) than not offering an 
apology. Across both studies, regardless of the level of responsibility 
and the level of injury, there were no differences between those 
receiving partial apologies and no apology in their evaluations of the 
offender's conduct, the offender's regret, the offender's belief that he 
or she was responsible, damage to the relationship, anger, the degree 
to which the offer would make up for the injuries, or forgiveness.221 
More troubling for the efficacy of partial apologies, however, were 
some indications that a partial apology has the potential to influence 
attributions in ways that are unlikely to facilitate negotiation, 
particularly when the offender's responsibility for the incident was 
more clear or when the resulting injury was more severe. Where the 
offender's responsibility was more clear, participants reported less 
sympathy toward the offender and predicted that the offender was less 
likely to be careful in the future when a partial apology was offered. 
Where the resulting injury was more severe, offering a partial apology 
increased attributions of responsibility to the offender and resulted in 
the offer being perceived as less likely to make up for the injuries 
received.222 Moreover, the results of the first study demonstrated that 
partial apologies may increase injured parties' uncertainty about 
whether or not they are inclined to accept or reject a particular 
settlement offer.223 These results suggest that not only do partial 
apologies not facilitate settlement in the ways that full apologies do, 
but that offering a partial apology may change perceptions in ways 
that could impede the discussion. 
On the other hand, there were some indications that, under the 
right circumstances, even a partial apology might be somewhat 
beneficial. Both when the responsibility for the incident was more 
ambiguous and when the injury was less severe, a partial apology was 
viewed as more sufficient than no apology.224 In addition, when the 
responsibility for the incident was more ambiguous, the offender's 
conduct was rated more favorably when a partial apology was offered 
than when the offender failed to offer an apology.225 Particularly 
where the offender's responsibility was less clear, participants were 
somewhat more open to apologies that did not accept responsibility. 
This suggests that there may be circumstances under which a partial 
apology is beneficial and (at least somewhat) better than failing to 
offer any expression of sympathy at all. 
221. See supra Parts III.Al, IIl.B.2. 
222. See supra notes 183-186 and accompanying text. 
223. See supra Part III.A.La. 
224. In neither case, however, was the partial apology viewed as being as sufficient as a 
full apology that accepted responsibility. See supra notes 187-188 and accompanying text. 
225. See supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
508 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 102:460 
Overall, then, it appears that a partial apology, while perhaps 
minimizing the risk that the apology will be considered an admission 
and result in an adverse liability decision,226 may not be terribly 
effective at improving the prospects for settlement. This may be 
because partial apologies do not communicate the same messages to 
recipients that full apologies do. In these studies, the partial apology, 
unlike the full apology, did not consistently convey to the recipient 
that the offender had accepted responsibility for his or her behavior, 
that he or she regretted the behavior, and, accordingly, that the 
offender would not repeat the conduct. Consistent with the 
fundamental attribution error,227 injured parties may attribute this 
failure to completely apologize to the character of the person, rather 
than to any constraints attendant to the legal system. Perhaps there is 
also a sense that the offender who offers only a partial apology has not 
sufficiently owned up to the consequences of his or her behavior.228 It 
is also possible that there are other sets of circumstances, not reflected 
in the vignettes used here, in which partial apologies are either 
particularly helpful or particularly detrimental.229 
Thus, a defendant or potential defendant who wants to fully 
apologize may face the uncertain effects of the apology on liability and 
damage-award decisions if settlement negotiations fail, but may 
benefit from an improved settlement climate and an improved chance 
of avoiding litigation altogether. Defendants contemplating a partial, 
sympathy-expressing apology may not face the same liability risks. 
The beneficial effects of such apologies are not clear, however, and 
there is evidence of some risk that perceptions will be negatively 
impacted. Thus, defendants must be carefully attuned to the types of 
factors identified here, in particular the severity of the plaintiff's injury 
and the degree to which the offender appears to be responsible,230 in 
evaluating these rules. 
226. As noted above, this is still an open empirical question. See supra note 19. 
227. See supra notes 199-207 and accompanying text. 
228. Taft, supra note 7. 
229. In particular, even under conditions in which the offender was less clearly 
responsible, the offender was judged to be relatively responsible. See supra note 156 and 
accompanying text. It is possible that when the level of the offender's responsibility is even 
less clear, a partial apology would be more effective. 
230. For example, a full apology might be considered (in particular) when the offender's 
responsibility is relatively clear. Under such conditions, there is evidence that a partial 
apology may impede settlement, there is much to be gained from a full apology in terms of 
the possibilities for settlement, and the marginal risk of increased liability due to accepting 
responsibility may be minimal given the independent evidence of fault. 
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C. Plaintiffs 
In contrast to defendants, plaintiffs or potential plaintiffs must 
determine how to respond to an apology from someone they believe 
has wronged them. Many observers have expressed concern that 
plaintiffs may be induced by an apology to agree to a settlement that 
does not provide them with the monetary recovery to which they are 
entitled.231 Importantly, this concern is sometimes dismissed by 
assuming that plaintiffs are capable of evaluating an apology for its 
sincerity and strategic motivation and can assess apologies and 
settlement offers accordingly.232 
The results of the present studies suggest that plaintiffs may, in 
fact, be able to critically evaluate the content of an apology and to 
distinguish those that they find credible and that communicate the 
necessary information from those that do not. Participants in the 
studies evaluated partial apologies very differently from full apologies. 
Participants did not interpret partial apologies as conveying the same 
evidence of regret, acceptance of responsibility, or likelihood of 
greater care in the future as full apologies.233 On the other hand, 
participants consistently did not distinguish among apologies that 
potentially exposed the offender to an increased risk of legal liability 
(no statutory protection) and those that did not (statutorily 
protected). Across both studies, the different evidentiary rules had no 
231 .  Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, supra note 3; Cohen, Legislating Apology, 
supra note 43; Levi, supra note 3, at 1 171 ("For instance, critics might ask, if a plaintiff settles 
because she's emotionally fulfilled by an apology, isn't she being duped out of her legal 
entitlement - an entitlement that the apology itself makes concrete?"); O'Hara & Yarn, 
supra note 10, at 1 186 ("[A]pology can be used as a tool for organizations to strategically 
take advantage of individual victims' instincts to forgive in the face of apology."). There is 
also some empirical evidence that an apology "script" dictates that an apology by an 
offender is to be followed by forgiveness by the recipient. See Mark Bennett & Christopher 
Dewberry, "I've said I'm sorry, haven't I? " A Study of the Identity Implications and 
Constraints that Apologies Create for Their Recipients, 13 CURRENT PSYCHOL. 10 (1994). 
This concern is part of a larger debate concerning the appropriateness of private settlement 
and issues of self-determination in settlement and mediation. See Fiss, supra note 4; Galanter 
& Cahill, supra note 4; Gary LaFree & Christine Rack, The Effects of Participants' Ethnicity 
and Gender on Monetary Outcomes in Mediated and Adjudicated Civil Cases, 30 LAW & 
SOC'Y REV. 767 (1996); McThenia & Shaffer, supra note 4; Menkel-Meadow, For and 
Against Settlement, supra note 4; Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute, supra note 4; Ellen 
Waldman, Substituting Needs for Rights in Mediation: Therapeutic or Disabling?, 5 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 1 103 (1999); Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self­
Determination in Court-Connected Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?, 6 
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1 (2001). 
232 See, e.g., Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, supra note 3, at 1067 ("If, as the 
recipient of an apology, you know that the apologizer has apologized in such a way as to 
ensure insulation from legal liability, you may attach less worth to that apology than 
otherwise, and a plaintiff's lawyer should be sure to point this out to her client."); see also 
Rehm & Beatty, supra note 10 (claiming that judges and jurors can distinguish apologies that 
admit fault from those that do not). 
233. See supra Parts III.Al, 111.B.2. 
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influence on participants' perceptions and attributions nor on 
settlement decisions.234 To the extent that participants did not 
distinguish these apologies, there is some risk that plaintiffs will be 
convinced by insincere or purely strategic apologies to settle for less 
than they might otherwise. 
The results of the present studies, however, do not clearly indicate 
whether or not an apology will induce a plaintiff to accept a smaller 
financial settlement.235 Specifically, these studies only assessed 
participants' propensities to accept or reject a particular settlement 
offer. In addition, while a full apology did result in an increase in the 
settlement rate in the first study, the more consistent result was that 
apologies influenced perceptions and attributions. Improvements in 
perceptions may not directly induce plaintiffs to accept inadequate 
offers that they might not otherwise be inclined to accept, but they 
may make it possible to begin or continue settlement discussions. 
Similar settlement terms may have ultimately been reached, but via a 
more difficult and time-consuming process. While it might be 
reasonable to infer that improved perceptions or a greater propensity 
to accept a particular offer might result in acceptance of a smaller 
amount than might otherwise have been agreed to, further empirical 
study ought to explore the extent to which potential litigants are 
willing to trade-off apologies and financial compensation.236 
With that caveat in mind, however, it is plausible that some 
plaintiffs would be willing to accept a smaller financial settlement if 
they receive an apology. If this is true, one explanation may be that 
they have been unfairly induced to forego their rightful compensation. 
An alternative explanation may be that they are more satisfied by a 
combination of financial compensation and the apology than they 
would have been with a larger monetary amount and no apology. 
Plaintiffs may value the apology more than or differently from 
financial compensation. Indeed, motivations other than legal 
entitlement and monetary recovery may be important to plaintiffs.237 
234. See supra Parts III.A.2, III.B.3. 
235. Given that most cases settle, settlements reached when an apology has been 
offered are most appropriately compared to what the plaintiffs would have gotten in 
bilateral settlement absent the apology rather than to what the plaintiffs could have or would 
have gotten at trial. 
236. For a general discussion of incommensurability in law, see Margaret Jane Radin, 
Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE L.J. 56 (1993), and Cass R. Sunstein, 
Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779 (1994). 
237. Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute, supra note 4, at 2677 ("[P]eople and entities in 
disputes may have a wide variety of interests (of which legal principles may be one class) and 
may decide that, in any given case, social, psychological, economic, political, moral, or 
religious principles should govern the resolution of their dispute."); Jean R. Sternlight, 
Lawyers' Representation of Clients in Mediation: Using Economics and Psychology to 
Structure Advocacy in a Nonadversarial Setting, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 269, 302-06 
(1999) (detailing a number of nonmonetary goals that parties may have - "may reflect a 
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While a monetary settlement may adequately restore financial losses 
resulting from an injury, an apology may be a better mechanism for 
restoring less tangible damage,238 expressing the proper relative moral 
positions of the parties,239 assuring the injured party that the offender 
will not reoffend,240 or achieving restorative justice.241 As Cohen notes, 
" [p]aying monetary damages may help take care of the financial 
consequences of an injury, but it may take an apology to 'wipe the 
moral ledger' clean and construct an understanding of the injury and 
the relationship which both parties can accept. "242 As described in the 
next Part, appropriate legal counseling may help to ensure that these 
preferences are respected while limiting the chances that an 
inappropriate settlement is reached. 
D. The Role of the Lawyer 
Defendants, then, face difficult decisions about whether or not to 
offer an apology and plaintiffs face difficult decisions about how to 
respond to offers of settlement that include or are accompanied by an 
rationality that is broader than the mere maximization of wealth"); Vincent et al., supra note 
12 (identifying four primary reasons plaintiffs pursued litigation: "accountability - wish to 
see staff disciplined and called to account; explanation - a combination of wanting an 
explanation and feeling ignored or neglected after the incident; standards of care - wishing 
to ensure that a similar incident did not happen again; and compensation - wanting 
compensation and an admission of negligence"); see also Robbennolt et al., supra note 17 
(arguing that legal decision makers simultaneously pursue numerous instrumental and 
symbolic goals). The extent to which negotiation and settlement, more broadly, track legal 
principles is unclear. See, e.g. , HERBERT KRITZER, LET'S MAKE A DEAL 30-56 (1991) 
(hereinafter KRITZER, LET'S MAKE A DEAL]; Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits 
Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1991); 
Robert J. Condlin, "Cases on Both Sides": Patterns of Argument in Legal Dispute 
Negotiation, 44 MD. L. REV. 65 (1985); John Lande, Getting the Faith: Why Business Lawyers 
and Executives Believe in Mediation, 5 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 137 (2000); Robert H. 
Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 
88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979). 
238. See Shuman, The Role of Apology in Tort Law, supra note 3, at 181 ("Practically, 
tort damages for these intangible losses (pain and suffering, loss of consortium, indignity, 
and grief) defy the formulation of an empirically grounded metric . . .  "); see also Daniel W. 
Shuman, The Psychology of Compensation in Tort Law, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 39, 71 (1994). 
Note also that apologies may mitigate damages in defamation cases. See supra note 17. 
239. See supra notes 78-85 and accompanying text. 
240. See supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text. 
241. See generally JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND RESPONSIVE 
REGULATION (2001); G. Bazemore, Restorative Justice and Earned Redemption, 41 AM. 
BEHAV. SCIENTIST 768 (1998); K. Daly & Russ Immarigeon, The Past, Present, and Future of 
Restorative Justice: Some Critical Reflections, 1 CONTEMP. JUST. REV. 21 (1998). 
242. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, supra note 3, at 1020; see also Lon L. Fuller, 
Mediation - Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 308 (1971) (describing 
mediation as having the capacity to reorient the parties toward each other, not by imposing 
rules on them, but by helping them to achieve a new and shared perception of their 
relationship, a perception that will redirect their attitudes and dispositions toward one 
another). 
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apology.243 For those parties who are represented by counsel, their 
attorneys may help them make these decisions. Indeed, there is 
empirical evidence that lawyers can have a notable influence on their 
clients' settlement decisions.244 
Through a process of counseling and deliberation, attorneys and 
clients together should attempt to evaluate the strategic and 
nonstrategic considerations surrounding apologies. David Binder, Paul 
Bergman, and Susan Price suggest that the attorney should engage in a 
process of counseling that assists the client in identifying the client's 
objectives, the possible options, and the likely consequences of those 
options, and in weighing the options given their probable 
consequences.245 Importantly, the attorney ought to facilitate the 
client's consideration of both the legal and nonlegal (e.g., economic, 
psychological, social, moral, political, and religious) consequences of 
the decision246 and recognize that objectives may change during the 
course of the representation.247 
Attorneys, as a consequence, must pay attention to what Len 
Riskin describes as the "problem definition" of the matter in 
dispute.248 Attorneys are trained to focus on settling a dispute in the 
243. Ethical rules reserve these decisions for the clients. Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct Rule l .2(a) provides that a "lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether to 
accept an offer of settlement of a matter." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.2(a) 
(2004). 
244. Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New 
Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEXAS L. REV. 77 (1997) (hereinafter Korobkin & 
Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement] (finding attorney influence on clients 
through education or explicit recommendations). See also DAVID A. BINDER & SUSAN C. 
PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING 186-87 (1977) (suggesting ways to 
minimize this influence); Sternlight, supra note 237, at 318-19 (describing dependence of 
client on attorney). See generally William L.F. Felstiner & Ben Pettit, Paternalism, Power, 
and Respect in Lawyer-Client Relations, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN LAW 135 
(Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton eds., 2000). For an empirical description of lawyer­
client relations see HERBERT M. KRITZER, THE JUSTICE BROKER 55-67 (1990). 
245. DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS 287-308 (1991); see also 
Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Legal Representation and the Next Steps Toward Client Control: 
Attorney Malpractice for the Failure to Allow the Client to Control Negotiation and Pursue 
Alternatives to Litigation, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 819 (1990); Gifford, supra note 103; 
Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Lawyers, Clients, and Mediation, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1369, 1381-82 (1998) ("Prudential discussions between lawyer and client about the relative 
merits of particular courses of action help to achieve participatory and educated client 
decisionmaking."). 
246. BINDER ET AL, supra note 245, at 2-15 (emphasizing the importance of nonlegal 
aspects of clients' problems); see also Nolan-Haley, supra note 245, at 1384 (arguing that the 
"content of attorney-client deliberation takes into account the totality of the clients' 
circumstances and may include the economic, social, psychological, moral, political, and 
religious consequences of actions."). 
247. BINDER ET AL, supra note 245, at 29; see also Gifford, supra note 103, at 838-39 
(emphasizing that information gained during the course of the representation or negotiation 
"often lead(s] the client to change his expectations concerning the negotiation or his 
preferences as to concessions"). 
248. Riskin, supra note 104 (describing problem definition in the context of mediation). 
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shadow of the law, with attention to the rights and responsibilities of 
the parties and to the likely outcome of a trial process. This focus 
defines the problem in its most narrow, legal sense.249 As a general 
matter, attorneys are likely to be more attuned to the legal 
implications of the apology than are the parties. It is important for 
attorneys to educate their clients about these legal implications. As 
Jacqueline Nolan-Haley argues, "clients must have a general 
knowledge about the relevant law governing their case, so that during 
deliberation they may meaningfully evaluate alternative courses of 
actions."250 In addition, attorneys may be more likely to evaluate the 
situation analytically rather than emotionally,251 and to be less 
influenced by concerns for equity in responding to settlement offers 
than are litigants.252 Accordingly, attorneys are likely to be well suited 
to assist the client in identifying the available alternatives and to 
identify and predict the probable legal consequences of the 
contemplated options.253 
At the other end of the spectrum, a broader conception of the 
problem would include interests that are less likely to be the focus of a 
legal proceeding.254 For example, a broad problem definition might 
include considerations of repairing and maintaining ongoing 
relationships, restoring equity, handling emotional reactions, achieving 
forgiveness or the need for an apology. Attorneys are 
249. Id. at 19. 
250. Nolan-Haley, supra note 245, at 1385. 
251. Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself: A Review of Empirical Research on Attorney 
Attributes Bearing on Professionalism, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1337 (1997); Chris Guthrie, The 
Lawyer's Philosophical Map and the Disputant's Perceptual Map: Impediments to Facilitative 
Mediation and Lawyering, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 145 (2001); Korobkin & Guthrie, 
Psychology, Economics, and Settlement, supra note 244, at 87 ("[L]egal training teaches 
lawyers to analyze legal conflicts carefully and unemotionally rather than react to them 
viscerally."); see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Transformation of Disputes by Lawyers: 
What the Dispute Paradigm Does and Does Not Tell Us, 1985 J. DISP. RESOL. 25 [hereinafter 
Menkel-Meadow, Dispute Paradigm].  Riskin writes: 
Lawyers are trained to put people and events into categories that are legally meaningful, to 
think in terms of rights and duties established by rules, to focus on acts more than persons. 
This view requires a strong development of cognitive capabilities, which is often attended by 
the under-cultivation of emotional faculties. 
Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 45 (1982). 
252. Korobkin & Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement, supra note 97 
(finding that attorneys were marginally less influenced by a concern for equity than were 
students in the role of litigants). But cf Richard Birke & Craig R. Fox, Psychological 
Principles in Negotiating Civil Settlements, 4 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1 (1999) (detailing a 
variety of ways that psychological heuristics may affect legal negotiations by attorneys); 
Sternlight, supra note 237 (detailing the same); Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 
86 CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2001) (demonstrating a variety of ways that psychological 
heuristics may affect the legal decisionmaking of judges). 
253. See BINDER ET AL., supra note 245, at 273-74. 
254. Riskin, supra note 104, at 20-21. 
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correspondingly likely to be less well suited to identify and weigh 
these nonlegal psychological and social considerations of the parties255 
- including the valuation of either giving or receiving an apology. 
Therefore, attorneys should remain mindful of the nonlegal 
significance of apologies while guiding clients through a process of 
considering and weighing the options given both their legal and non­
legal consequences. In the process, attorneys must provide 
information to allow the client to understand the legal consequences 
of the options, while taking care to avoid monetizing the dispute when 
the client could gain more utility from a settlement that combines 
monetary and nonmonetary elements.256 
In this way, defense attorneys have a key role to play in assisting 
their clients to critically evaluate the legal risks and benefits of an 
apology.257 The traditional view has been to conceive of the defense 
attorney's role as "to protect their clients from having to admit 
wrongdoing or having to make legal compensation for the harms they 
cause."258 A more nuanced advisory role, however, may be 
appropriate. Defense attorneys can help their clients identify the 
potential legal and nonlegal consequences of offering an apology. The 
attorney may be best positioned to evaluate the merits of the case, the 
probable outcomes of negotiation or trial, and the legal implications of 
the apology for those outcomes - legal implications for the 
possibilities for settlement, for liability judgments, and for damage 
awards. The defendant may be best positioned to evaluate the 
importance to her of offering the apology and of the other non-
255. See BINDER ET AL., supra note 245, at 272-73. Williams studied a sample of cases 
that were scheduled for trial. He found that in fifty-three percent of the cases that did 
proceed to trial, "the reason they went to trial was not a failure of the two attorneys to work 
out a framework for agreement. Rather, it was the failure of one lawyer or the other to 
'bring his client along.' " Williams, supra note 11,  at 24. Williams notes that one way to 
characterize this finding is as "a failure of one lawyer or the other to adequately 
communicate with his or her own client, by which I mean a failure to adequately understand 
the underlying interests and needs of one's own client." Williams, supra note 1 1 ,  at 25 n.74. 
256. See Korobkin & Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement, supra note 244, 
at 134 (observing that clients may act in ways that maximize their utility, though not their 
wealth); Menkel-Meadow, Dispute Paradigm, supra note 251; Riskin, supra note 251 ,  at 44 
(noting that on the lawyer's "standard philosophical map" the "victory is reduced to a 
money judgment"); Sternlight, supra note 237, at 321-22 ("[The attorney] may regard these 
[nonmonetary) interests as having little or no value."); id. at 324 ("Lawyers will also tend to 
dismiss, as fluff, offers or requests for apology."). Moreover, lawyers may have to address 
their own disincentives to settle cases for less cash and an apology. See ROBERT H. 
MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING 118 (2000) ("As one plaintiffs attorney told us, 'You 
can't pay the rent with one-third of an apology.' "); see also Sternlight, supra note 237, at 322 
("[T)hese nonmonetary goals likely have little appeal for the attorney, who, after all, cannot 
take a one-third contingency of an apology."). See generally KRITZER, LET'S MAKE A DEAL, 
supra note 237, at 100-10. 
257. See generally Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, supra note 3 (describing the 
role of the attorney in advising a client to apologize). 
258. Williams, supra note 11 ,  at 53 (describing this role). 
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tangible benefits of offering an apology.259 In addition, particularly if a 
partial apology is contemplated, the defendant, assisted by counsel, 
must also consider aspects of the case that are likely to make such an 
apology more or less effective.2ro The defendant, then, in consultation 
with defense counsel, can determine whether or not to offer an 
apology given the way in which the defendant weighs these 
considerations. 
Similarly, plaintiffs' attorneys may play a key role in assisting their 
clients in evaluating the credibility of an apology and any 
corresponding settlement offer.261 Plaintiffs' attorneys can help their 
clients identify the potential legal and nonlegal consequences of 
accepting a settlement offer following or accompanied by an apology. 
Plaintiffs' attorneys may be best positioned to evaluate the merits of 
the case, the legal consequences for the plaintiff of the defendant's 
apology, and the effects of any applicable evidentiary rules. Moreover, 
plaintiffs' attorneys may be able to help their clients avoid an unjust 
financial settlement by explaining the client's legal entitlements and 
predicting the outcomes of accepting the offer, continuing to 
negotiate, or proceeding to trial.262 In contrast, the client can provide 
an assessment of the importance and meaning that receiving the 
apology has for her. The plaintiff, then, in consultation with her 
attorney, can assess the degree to which she is satisfied with the 
settlement offer. 
CONCLUSION 
The findings reported here support the conclusion that apologies 
can be beneficial in facilitating settlement of disputes. The results also 
suggest, however, that apologies influence settlement in relatively 
complex ways. Several factors, such as the nature of the apology, the 
severity of the injury, and the other evidence of responsibility, affect 
the capacity of an apology to facilitate settlement. Full, responsibility­
accepting apologies positively impacted participants' perceptions of 
the situation and the prospects for settlement. Conversely, partial 
sympathy-expressing apologies had fewer effects, had both positive 
259. See supra note 1 1  (describing nonstrategic benefits of apologizing). 
260. For example, the nature of the plaintiffs injuries, the degree to which the 
defendant appears responsible, etc. 
261. See, e.g., Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, supra note 3, at 1067 ("If, as the 
recipient of an apology, you know that the apologizer has apologized in such a way as to 
ensure insulation from legal liability, you may attach less worth to that apology than 
otherwise, and a plaintiffs lawyer should be sure to point this out to her client."). 
Conversely, plaintiffs' attorneys can raise the possibility with their clients that the other 
party's failure to apologize stems from the situational constraints of the legal system. 
262. See Sternlight, supra note 1 1 ,  at 274 (arguing that even in mediation "the attorney 
must be active and assertive to ensure that her client is not coerced by the opposing party"). 
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and negative effects, and were more dependent on context. 
Policymakers, litigants, and lawyers must take into account these 
complex effects when making decisions about the appropriate role of 
apologies in settling civil disputes. 
